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"[T]reaty rights with respect to reservation lands must be
read in light of the subsequent alienation of those lands."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Increasingly over the last thirty years, American Indian
tribes have asserted broad governmental power over persons
living and doing business within the boundaries of Indian res-
ervations. These persons include as many as 350,000 non-
Indian reservation residents and countless other nonmembers
2
1. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 558 (1981).
2. As will be explained later, nonmembers generally stand in the same shoes as
non-Indians. See infra notes 319-321 and accompanying text. Thus, the terms "non-
Indian" and "nonmember" should be read interchangeably. See generally Duro v.
Reina, 110 S.Ct. 2053 (1990).
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who conduct business on the reservations.' Surprised and
angered at such assertions, nonmembers have begun challeng-
ing tribes on the ground that such assertions are beyond the
scope of tribal governmental power.
In the face of these challenges, courts have had difficulty
articulating the nature and scope of tribal governmental
power. The United States Supreme Court has stated that
Indian tribes are "unique aggregations possessing attributes of
sovereignty over both their members and their territory."4 It
is said that those attributes of sovereignty that have never
been extinguished5 retain their preconstitutional status; those
attributes are thereby shielded from constitutional scrutiny.s
In theory, of course, Indian tribes must respect some of the
Bill of Rights protections as embodied in the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA).' In fact, constitutional protections
are often unavailable because of the Supreme Court's holding
in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez' that, except for habeas
corpus, tribal forums enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over actions
brought to enforce the ICRA; therefore, there is absolutely no
guarantee that Indian tribes will provide due process or equal
protection in the exercise of their governmental powers.' Such
3. General Population Characteristics, 1980 Census of Population for the State of
Washington, Table 55, PC 80-1-B49 [hereinafter 1980 Census].
4. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
5. Congress has plenary power to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local
self-government that the tribes otherwise possess. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U.S. 49, 56 (1978); see also Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445 (1898); Head
Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884); The Cherokee Tobacco Case, 78 U.S. 616 (1870).
6. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896).
7. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1983).
8. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
9. Id. at 59. Indeed, according to the United States Department of Justice,
"substantial evidence now exists that tribal forums may . . . fail fully to protect
individuals from arbitrary and unfair action[s] of tribal governments." Letter from
John R. Bolton, Assistant Attorney General, to Senator Daniel Inouye, Chairman,
Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs (Jan. 26, 1988) [hereinafter "Bolton
Letter"]. No doubt, such abuse stems partly from the fact that most tribal
governments lack any separation of powers. A 1984 presidential commission found
that "the failure to establish a clear separation of powers between the tribal council
and the tribal judiciary has resulted in political interference with tribal courts,
weakening their independence, and raising doubts about fairness and the role of law."
Report and Recommendations to the President of the United States, The 1984 Report
of the Presidential Commission on Indian Reservation Economies, Part One, 29. In
many cases tribal courts are simply an arm of the tribal council; at the council's whim
judicial orders may be quashed and judges may be removed or even barred from
holding any further political offices. See, e.g., Runs After v. United States, 766 F.2d 347
(8th Cir. 1985); Shortbull v. Looking Elk, 677 F.2d 645 (8th Cir. 1982). The Justice
Department notes that "in at least 27 tribes the council hears appeals from tribal court
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a scheme is an American civil rights anomaly. 10
For example, one of the preconstitutional powers of an
Indian tribe is the power to select the members of the tribe."
Only members may participate in the tribal governmental pro-
cess. Thus, simply because of their race,'12 non-Indians are
denied the right to vote in tribal elections, the right to partici-
pate as candidates for tribal office, and the right to organize
and meaningfully participate in the tribal political process. In
any other context, the denial of such fundamental rights by a
local government would be quickly challenged and struck
down as unconstitutional." For historical reasons, however,
Indian tribal governments merit special consideration.
The United States made treaty promises to Indians
whereby the tribes were removed to lands where they were to
continue to enjoy their original independence and sover-
judgment[s]." Bolton Letter, supra (quoting AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYERS TRAINING
PROGRAM, INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE ROLE OF TRIBAL COURTS 59 (1977)).
Finally, Indians and non-Indians alike may be denied effective judicial review for civil
rights violations simply because a tribe either lacks a court or refuses to waive its
sovereign immunity. See Bolton Letter, supra (tribal courts are available in only about
one-half of the nation's nearly 300 federally recognized Indian tribes); Johnson &
Madden, Sovereign Immunity in Indian Tribal Law, 12 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 153, 167
n.59 (1984) (listing cases in which tribes refused to waive sovereign immunity). The
Supreme Court will revisit the sovereign immunity doctrine this term in a case
presenting the question whether a tribe may operate a business open to the general
public, selling cigarettes and other items without complying with any applicable state
tax law by virtue of the sovereign immunity doctrine. (Oklahoma Tax Commission v.
The Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 888 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir.
1990), cert. granted, 58 U.S.L.W. 3566 (Mar. 6, 1990).
10. Confronted with this constitutional anomaly in the criminal context, the
Supreme Court flatly denied that tribes possessed any such powers. By virtue of their
dependent status, Indian tribes have been implicitly divested of criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), and
nonmember Indians. Duro v. Reina, 110 S.Ct. 2053 (1990).
11. Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218 (1897).
12. Some might argue that the tribes are not racially based organizations but
rather political organizations. The distinction is illusory, however, because unless a
person has a certain blood quantum he or she may not become a tribal member. Thus,
race is the crucial, if not determinative, factor with respect to tribal membership. Cf.
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 52-53 (1978); but see Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535, 551-55 (1974).
13. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking
down an annual poll tax of $1.50); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621
(1969) (striking down statute limiting the right to vote in school district elections to
people who either (i) owned or leased property within the district or (ii) were parents
of children in the district's public schools); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970) (right
to participate as a candidate for political office); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968)
(right to organize and meaningfully participate in the political process).
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eignty.14 Pursuant to these treaties and the overall early fed-
eral policy of nonintercourse with Indian tribes,'5 non-Indians
were forbidden to pass over or settle on these reservations.
16
In light of this nonintercourse policy, the treaties essentially
promised that, in exchange for confining themselves to reser-
vations, the tribes would be allowed to retain their powers of
self-government over tribal members in Indian country. This
Article will refer to this promise of tribal self-government as
"the first promise."
Pursuant to its plenary power over Indian affairs, the
United States later broke its first promise,'17 however, by
breaking up the communal tribal property system. In its stead,
through the allotment acts of the late 1800s, the federal gov-
ernment instituted a system of private property ownership.
Under those acts, individual Indians were allotted 160-acre par-
cels carved from reservation lands.'" The allotment acts were
an effort to "Americanize" the Indians; that is, to teach them
the virtues of farming and private property ownership and,
eventually, to make them American citizens. To further this
policy of assimilation, the allotment acts provided that Indian
allottees were to have "the benefit of and be subject to the
laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or Territory in which
they may reside... ,,19 Thus, Indians were to be subject to the
14. See, e.g., Treaty with the Yakima Indian Nation, 12 Stat. 951, art. 11 (1859).
15. Although the first four enactments of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act
were temporary and sporadic, in 1802 Congress passed the first permanent Trade and
Intercourse Act. Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139. See also Act of May 6, 1822,
ch. 58, 3 Stat. 682; Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (repealed in part) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152, 1160, 1165 (1982), 25 U.S.C. §§ 177, 179-80, 193-94, 201,
229-30, 251, 263, 264 (1982)).
16. See, e.g., Treaty with Yakima Nation, 12 Stat. 951 (1859). This language merely
duplicated what was already federal law under the nonintercourse acts.
17. "It is long settled the 'the provisions of an act of Congress, passed in the
exercise of its constitutional authority .... if clear and explicit, must be upheld by the
courts, even in contravention of express stipulations in an earlier treaty'.. . . This
Court [has] applied that rule to congressional abrogation of Indian treaties .. "
United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986) (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 720 (1893)).
18. See General Allotment (Dawes) Act, Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).
19. Id. § 6, 24 Stat. at 390; but see Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes,
425 U.S. 463 (1976) (explicitly ignoring the clear meaning of the provision). Recently,
however, the Ninth Circuit reevaluated the Moe decision in light of Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), and Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the
Yakima Nation, 109 S.Ct. 2994 (1989), and determined that section 6 still retains some
vitality. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. County of
Yakima, 903 F.2d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 1990).
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white men's law, but the white men were to be free from tribal
law.
When the United States abrogated its treaty promises, it
also made new promises-to which this Article will collectively
refer to as "the second promise"-to non-Indian American citi-
zens. To facilitate the process of assimilation of Indians into
American society, the federal government invited non-Indians
to purchase surplus reservation lands and to establish their
homes and businesses there. Inherent in this invitation was
the non-Indian expectation that they would be governed by,
and be afforded the protections of, state (or territorial) and
federal law.20 Indeed, the allotment acts contemplated the end
of all tribal governmental power.2 '
The current "civil war"2 2 being waged over the extent of
tribal government power over nonmembers' and their lands
and resources within the original reservation boundaries sim-
ply reflects the tension2 4 between the two sets of promises: the
first promise made to the Indian tribes in the treaties and the
second promise made to non-Indian citizens in the allotment
acts. In federal judicial forums, litigants generally base their
arguments on either the first promise or the second promise.
For that reason, federal courts must often reconcile the two.
20. See Montana, 450 U.S. 560 n.9. See also allotment acts discussion, infra notes
124-149 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 124-149 and accompanying text.
22. "The United States is in the midst of a new civil war. Unlike the last civil war,
it is not between the states and the Union; rather, it is a challenge by American Indian
tribes against states and the United States. Unlike the last one, this civil war has seen
many of its battles occur in state and federal courts." Martone, American Indian
Tribal Self-Government in the Federal System: Inherent Right or Congressional
License?, 51 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 600 (1976) [hereinafter Martone, Congressional
License?].
23. This Article uses the terms "nonmember" and "non-Indian" interchangeably.
24. A more general articulation of this tension is as follows: "The principle of
self-government, grounded in notions of inherent sovereignty and in congressional
policies, seeks an accommodation between the interests of the Tribes and the Federal
Government, on the one hand, and those of the States, on the other." Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 156 (1980) (citing
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 179 (1973)). Notice that the
quote implicitly ignores the interest of the federal government in protecting its non-
Indian citizens from assertions of power from a government in which they have no
voice. But see Duro v. Reina, 110 S.Ct. 2053, 2063 (1990) ("we hesitate to adopt a view
of tribal sovereignty that would single out another group of citizens, nonmember
Indians, for trial by political bodies that do not include them."); Brendale, 109 S.Ct.
2994, 3011 (1989) (Stevens, J., noting that it is "improbable that Congress envisioned
that the Tribe would retain its interest in regulating .. . nonmembers who lack any
voice in setting tribal policy.").
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Academic commentators, however, generally focus only on the
first promise, largely ignoring the ramifications of the second.25
In an attempt to open up the academic debate, therefore, sec-
tion II of this Article will examine the nature and scope of tri-
bal governmental power, and will survey and critique the
competing theories thereon.
This Article submits that the Indian law "civil war" can be
settled through a judicial interpretation of the Wheeler-How-
ard Act's reconciliation of the two promises. In section III(C),
perhaps for the first time, the legislative history of that major
piece of legislation will be thoroughly tracked and analyzed.26
With that legislative history as a backdrop, section IV
rethinks the state of Indian law, beginning with an analogy to
the tenth amendment. Applying that analogy, this Article
argues that current Supreme Court reasoning concerning the
reserved powers of state governments undermines Supreme
Court reasoning with respect to the retained powers of tribal
governments. This Article also argues that tribal assertions of
power over nonmembers constitute "state action" and, as such,
should be subject to constitutional due process and equal pro-
tection constraints. Third, this Article will apply its thesis by
discussing and critiquing a recent Supreme Court decision con-
cerning tribal zoning authority over nonmembers. Fourth, the
Article posits an explicit theory concerning tribal governmen-
tal powers that is consistent with the legislative history of the
Wheeler-Howard Act and the implicit reasoning of recent
Supreme Court decisions.
As part of this theory, this Article also posits two general
normative propositions that will help produce a just and effi-
cient resolution of the current civil war within Indian country.
First, subject to extensive federal oversight and control, an
Indian tribe should maintain exclusive jurisdiction over its tri-
bal members and their property and resources. This first prop-
osition allows the tribes to maintain their powers of internal
self-government. Second, states should maintain exclusive
jurisdiction over nonmembers and their property and
resources. This second proposition should ameliorate the cur-
25. See, e.g., Note, Congressional Abrogation of Indian Treaties: Reevaluation and
Reform, 98 YALE L. J. 793 (1989).
26. Cf. Comment, Tribal SeVf-Government and the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934, 95 MICH. L. REv. 955 (1972) [hereinafter Comment, Tribal Self-Government].
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rent threat to constitutional protections afforded nonmember
citizens.
Finally, to ensure that these general propositions do not
operate too harshly and do not nullify each other in practical
operation, this Article proposes that the Court explicitly estab-
lish and apply a mirror image, strict scrutiny test that is consis-
tent with the implicit reasoning of some recent Court
decisions. Under this test, tribes would maintain some jurisdic-
tion over nonmembers or their property and resources, but
only if such tribal jurisdiction is necessary to protect the tribe's
effective control over its members, their property, or resources.
Likewise, in similar circumstances, states would maintain some
jurisdiction over tribal members and their property and
resources. This test thus recognizes that some tension between
these two propositions might still remain, and provides a
means of resolving that tension. This Article, therefore, offers
a practical escape from the current jurisdictional labyrinth of
Indian law.
II. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF INDIAN TRIBAL POWER
A. The Concept of "Sovereignty" as It Relates to
Indian Tribes
The uncertainty surrounding the nature and scope of tri-
bal governmental powers has created the modern Indian law
civil war. The summation of these powers is sometimes
referred to as "tribal self-government," and other times as "tri-
bal sovereignty." The distinction is significant because self-
government merely connotes governmental power over a lim-
ited class of persons, i.e., tribal members, whereas true sover-
eignty includes governmental power over territory and all
persons within that territory.
While the word "sovereignty" is both powerful and elu-
sive, it is a word frequently invoked in Indian law circles.' As
27. See, e.g., McSloy, American Indians and the Constitution: An Argument for
Nationhood, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 139 (1989) [hereinafter McSloy, An Argument for
Nationhood]; C. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANs, TIME, AND rTHE LAW (Yale, 1987)
[hereinafter, C. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS]; McCoy, The Doctrine of Tribal
Sovereignty: Accommodating Tribal, State, and Federal Interests, 13 HARv. C.R. C.L.
L. REV. 357 (1978); Mettler, A Unified Theory of Indian Tribal Sovereignty, 30
HASTINGS L. J. 90 (1978); Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and
Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195 (1984); Werhan, The Sovereignty of Indian Tribes:
A Reaffirmation and Strengthening in the 1970's, 54 NOTRE DAME L. J. 5 (1978). Prior
to the 1978 opinion in United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), arguments based
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a result, in spite of strong admonitions of the effort's futility,'
some attempt must be made to define the concept of sover-
eignty. For purposes of international law, the Restatement
(Second) of Foreign Relations Law defines a "state" as "an
entity that has [1] a defined territory and [2] population under
the control of a government and [3] that engages in foreign
relations."29
Tribes do have defined territories: Indian territory is all
land to which the Indian title has not been extinguished.3 0 At
one time Indian territories were easily demarcated as all land
within the exterior boundaries of the reservations. The allot-
ment acts, however, changed the ease of that demarcation.
When fee patents were issued, Indian title was extinguished.
Today, therefore, the current territory of many Indian tribes
often resembles a checkerboard rather than a solid geographic
area.3
1
Tribes also have defined populations: a tribe's population
includes all people who accept tribal offers of membership.
on the concept of "inherent tribal sovereignty" fell on deaf ears in the Supreme Court.
Before Wheeler, the only other court in this century to analyze "inherent tribal
sovereignty" did so in the context of "sovereign immunity." In United States v. U.S.
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940), the Court stated: "These Indian Nations
are exempt from suit without Congressional authorization. It is as though the
immunity which was theirs as sovereigns passed to the United States for their benefit,
as their tribal properties did." Id. at 512 n.11.
28. "Who or what is a sovereignty? What is his or its sovereignty? On this subject
the errors and the mazes are endless and inexplicable." Martone, Congressional
License?, supra note 22, at 600 (quoting Chisholm v. Georgia, 1 U.S. 419, 456 (1793)).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNIED STATES
§ 4 (1965).
30. [AIll that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and not within
the States of Missouri and Louisiana, or the Territory of Arkansas, and also
that part of the United States east of the Mississippi River, and not within any
State to which the Indian title has not been extinguished, for purposes of this
act, be taken and deemed Indian country.
Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (codified in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.); see
also Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204, 208 (1877) (eliminating potential ambiguity in statute
by ruling that the definition applies to all lands, whether east or west of the Missis-
sippi River); United States v. Chavez, 290 U.S. 357, 364 (1933); F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 309-310 (1942) [hereinafter 1942 COHEN HANDBOOK]. Note that
for purposes of criminal jurisdiction, the definition of "Indian country" is much
broader. That definition includes "all land within the limits of any Indian reservation
under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance
of any patent .. " 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1979). But section 1151 "does not have general
applicability in the civil context." Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation v. County of Yakima, 903 F.2d 1207, 1217 (9th Cir. 1990).
31. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Nation, 109 S.Ct.
2994, 3016-17 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring); Confederated Tribes, 903 F.2d at 1207.
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Tribes may govern the internal relations of these members
pursdant to their preconstitutional (or inherent) sovereignty. 2
Subject to extensive federal oversight and control, tribes con-
tinue to exercise both criminal and civil jurisdiction over tribal
members.3 3
It is well settled, however, that tribes no longer enjoy any
powers to engage in foreign relations (e.g., enter into treaties
with foreign nations).' But that fact alone does not mean that
tribes cannot be considered sovereigns. Depending on all the
circumstances, a state may delegate the conduct of foreign rela-
tions and other functions without necessarily ceasing to be a
state under international law.35
Nonetheless, compared to that of most "nations," the "sov-
ereignty" of Indian tribes is quite limited3 because, as a gen-
eral rule, tribal jurisdiction is based upon consent.3 7 One gives
consent by accepting the privileges of tribal membership or by
establishing what might be termed "minimum contacts" with a
tribe.38 Thus, tribal governmental power is a personal, rather
than a territorial, sovereignty. 39 Additionally, even this per-
sonal sovereignty is subject to the overriding plenary power of
Congress.4' Before concluding that the term "tribal self-gov-
ernment" more aptly describes the nature and scope of tribal
governmental powers than does "tribal sovereignty," this Arti-
cle will first briefly examine and critique a spectrum of com-
peting theories of tribal governmental powers. Then, this
Article will turn to the historical evaluation of the exercise of
congressional plenary power over Indian affairs and how that
exercise has affected tribal powers of self-government.
32. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); United States v. Wheeler,
435 U.S. 313 (1978); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
33. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); United States v. Wheeler,
435 U.S. 313 (1978); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
34. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
35. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 4 comment b (1965).
36. Duro v. Reina, 110 S.Ct. 2053, 2060 (1990).
37. "Tribal authority over members, who are also citizens ... is accepted by our
precedents and justified by the voluntary character of tribal membership and the
concomitant right of participation in a tribal government, the authority of which rests
upon consent." Id. at 2064. Nonmembers may consent to tribal jurisdiction by
entering into consensual relations with a tribe. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,
565 (1981).
38. For nonmembers, these "minimum contacts" will not be implied. Duro, 110
S.Ct. at 2065.
39. See infra notes 207-219 and accompanying text.
40. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
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B. The Competing Theories of Tribal Governmental Powers:
A Quick Survey
Perhaps because tribes do not fit neatly into our constitu-
tional democracy, academic legal journals abound with conflict-
ing theories on tribal "sovereignty." The debate covers a
sweeping terrain. One theory postulates that tribal self-gov-
ernment is merely a congressional license. Another states that
tribes are independent nations and should be recognized as
such by the United Nations. Finally, a number of theories
occupying the middle ground of this continuum accept the doc-
trine of congressional plenary power 4 ' but differ on what the
exercise of that power means. Since the repudiation of the ter-
mination policy in the late 1950s, Indian law battles have been
fought in the trenches of this middle ground.
1. The Tribal Self-Government As Congressional
License View
An implicit general rule seems to govern academic Indian
law commentators: Appeal to the white man's guilty con-
science and propound an expansive vision of exclusive tribal
sovereignty and self-determination. The works of Frederick J.
Martone are the exception to that rule. Rather than dwell on
what should or should not have been done in the past, Martone
performs his analysis on the "actual state of things."42
Martone argues that because "[t]he Constitution was not
designed with tribes in mind . . .Congress has been caught
between changing tides of opinion running from full separation
to total assimilation."43 He argues that the concept of inherent
tribal sovereignty is really a legal fiction: "Allotment, termina-
tion, and grants of jurisdiction could not pass muster if tribes
had inherent rights to self-government, with origins other than
the Congress." 44 The subject of Indian affairs is a political
41. Even the more radical commentators recognize, as they must, that federal
plenary power over Indian affairs is an "axiom of United States' jurisprudence."
McSloy, An Argument for Nationhood, supra note 27, at 141.
42. This was also the approach taken by Chief Justice Marshall in Worcester v.
Georgia. "[Plower, war, conquest, give rights, which, after possession, are conceded by
the world; and which can never be controverted by those on whom they descend. We
proceed, then, to the actual state of things, having glanced at their origin; because
holding it in our recollection might shed some light on existing pretensions."
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 543 (1832).
43. Martone, Congressional License?, supra note 22, at 634.
44. Id. Martone refers to tribal self-government, not tribal sovereignty.
1991]
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question to be dealt with largely through the legislative, not
the judicial process. Therefore, the Supreme Court "should
forthrightly deny the existence of inherent tribal sover-
eignty."45  Finally, he argues that "[a] contrary conclusion
would render the entire legislative scheme unconstitutional."
The latter argument presents an interesting and difficult
question. Would not the denial of all inherent tribal powers,
rather than the acceptance of some inherent tribal powers,
render the entire American Indian legislative scheme unconsti-
tutional? If no Indian powers are inherent, then they all must
be delegated.47 If they are all delegated, then none are extra-
constitutional."s In other words, if no Indian powers are inher-
ent, then, surely, Congress cannot set up, and the Court cannot
countenance, the current tribal political scheme. 49  At least
with respect to internal tribal affairs, this is not the law.'
The defect in Martone's thesis lies in its attempt to estab-
lish an absolute theory concerning the nature of tribal govern-
mental powers. He tries to prove too much. It is not necessary
to resort to a dichotomy to solve the "mystery which surrounds
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. The Court has expressly rejected this proposition. In Wheeler, the Court held
that the federal government could try a Navajo Indian for rape when he had already
pleaded guilty to a lesser offense in tribal court without violating the federal
prohibition on double jeopardy.
The power to punish offenses against tribal law committed by Tribe members,
which was part of the Navajos' primeval sovereignty, has never been taken
away from them, either explicitly or implicitly, and is attributable in no way
to any delegation to them of federal authority. It follows that when the
Navajo Tribe exercises this power, it does so as part of its retained sovereignty
and not as an arm of the Federal Government.
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 328 (1978) (emphasis added.)
48. If none are extraconstitutional, then all tribal powers, even those over tribal
internal affairs, would be subject to the Constitution.
49. Tribal members are denied any guarantee of effective judicial review for
alleged violations of the Indian Civil Rights Act. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
436 U.S. 49 (1978). Even more troubling, by virtue of their ancestry, non-Indians are
denied any voice in the tribal political process by which their property or liberty may
be affected.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); Talton v. Mayes, 163
U.S. 376 (1896). Even the four current members of the Court who subscribe to the
general principle that Indian tribes enjoy no inherent governmental powers over non-
Indian reservation residents or property, respect the principle that tribes retain
"inherent sovereignty independent of that authority arising from their [property]
power to exclude .. , by way of tribal self-government and control over... its internal
affairs." Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Nation, 109 S.Ct.
2994, 3005 (1989) (emphasis supplied).
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the tribes' claim to sovereignty."'" That is, the concept of tri-
bal self-government is not necessarily either an inherent right
or a congressional license.52 Because modern tribal govern-
mental powers derive from both sources, the proper inquiry
should focus upon which attributes are inherent and which are
congressionally licensed. This Article argues that tribes retain
inherent power to govern internal relations concerning tribal
members, tribal lands (defined as all land to which the Indian
title has not been extinguished)5" and tribal resources. By con-
sidering state action principles,' 4 however, this Article argues
that external relations are, in Martone's words, "congressio-
nally licensed" and therefore subject to the Constitution. Per-
haps the greatest lesson of the Martone article is a simple
reminder on methodology: look to the relevant treaties and
statutes.55 In other words, Martone argues for an inquiry into
the specific promises made to tribes in the the treaties and the
means in which Congress qualified those promises by enacting
later statutes.
2. The Views of Felix S. Cohen
The views of Felix S. Cohen represent the academic mid-
dle ground of the competing theories of tribal sovereignty. In
an opinion issued by the Department of the Interior just
months after the enactment of the Wheeler-Howard (Indian
Reorganization) Act of 1934, Felix S. Cohen' wrote:
Perhaps the most basic principle in all Indian law.., is that
those powers which are lawfully vested in an Indian tribe
are not, in general, delegated powers granted by express acts
of Congress, but rather inherent powers of a limited sover-
eignty which has never been extinguished.57
Cohen's 1942 Handbook of Federal Indian Law further
developed the thesis of the 1934 opinion as follows:
The whole course of judicial decision on the nature of Indian
51. Martone, Congressional License?, supra note 22, at 635.
52. Id. at 600.
53. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 261-274 and accompanying text.
55. Martone, Congressional License?, supra note 22, at 635.
56. Felix S. Cohen is the preeminent commentator on Indian law, and perhaps the
key player in the history of the Wheeler-Howard Act of 1934. See infra notes 171, 199-
238 and accompanying text.
57. Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 14, 1 Op. Solic. Gen. 445 (1934)
[hereinafter "Powers of Indian Tribes"].
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tribal powers is marked by adherence to three fundamental
principles: (1) An Indian tribe possesses, in the first
instance, all the powers of any sovereign state. (2) Conquest
renders the tribe subject to the legislative power of the
United States and, in substance, terminates the external
powers of sovereignty of the tribe, e.g., its power to enter
into treaties with foreign nations, but does not by itself
affect the internal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e., its power of
local self-government. (3) These powers are subject to quali-
fication by treaties and by express legislation of Congress,
but, save as thus expressly qualified, full powers of internal
sovereignty are vested in the Indian tribes and in their duly
constituted organs of governments."
Although Cohen views tribal powers as inherent, he also
recognizes that they continue to exist only at the sufferance of
Congress: Without a treaty or some form of federal recogni-
tion, the Court will not recognize any claim of tribal power.5 9
58. 1942 COHEN HANDBOOK supra note 29, at 122-23. For a further explication of
Cohen's views, see Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the
United States, 31 GEO. L.J. 1, 9-16 (1942). Cohen argues that American Indian law
principles derive from the teachings of the Spanish Dominican theologian, Francisco
de Vitoria.
It is a highly debatable question whether American Indian policy is based on
Spanish thinking. Cf. Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. 711 (1835). There are
fundamental differences between the Spanish empire in South and Central America
and the British and French empires in North America. For instance, the Spanish came
the New World primarily as single males. Soldiers, in search of gold and treasures,
sought to integrate the Indian civilizations, such as the Incas, and replace their despots
with the Crown of Spain. Moreover, Spanish missionaries sought to convert aborigines
to Catholicism. These actions are "assimilationist" in nature. To the contrary, the
settlers in North America came as families. They feared the Indians. While wishing
for peace, the North America settlers originally established a policy of complete
separation and nonintercourse with Indians.
As a practical matter, resolution of the question presented above is largely
irrelevant because even Vitoria's teachings on the nature of just war and legitimate
title provide wide latitude for retrospective arguments supporting European, and later
American, actions. See Schwarzenberger, THE FRONTIERS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 52-
53 (1962). Moreover, regardless of whether one agrees with the original moral
justification of such actions, it is a well settled principle that "power, war, conquest,
give rights, which, after possession, are conceded by the world .• ."; hence, our legal
analysis must proceed on "the actual state of things." Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
515, 543 (1832).
59. For example, with respect to a federal taking of land, the Court has held that
mere Indian occupation of land without federal recognition of ownership creates no
vested rights in a tribe. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 285 (1955).
See also Martone, Congressional License?, supra note 22, at 602-603, citing Cayuga
Indian Claims (Great Britain v. United States, 20 AM. J. INT'L L. 574, 577 (1926)). In an
arbitration in which Roscoe Pound participated, it was stated that, "so far as an Indian
tribe exists as a legal unit, it is by virtue of the domestic law of the sovereign nation
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This qualification of tribal self-government raises several
critical issues that Cohen, in effect, avoids addressing. First, if
Congress once divests tribal governmental powers but subse-
quently enacts legislation that permits the same, then arguably
most modern tribal powers are truly delegated. Second, it is
unclear whether it should matter that the powers are divested
explicitly, as in the allotment acts,60 or merely implicitly, as in
the context of tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers
who commit crimes on Indian lands.6 ' Third, Cohen provides
no basis for the assertion that all powers are inherent and
none are delegated.6 2  Finally, given that tribal self-govern-
ment is subject to congressional plenary power6 3 and thus con-
tinues to exist only because the Congress so wills, an argument
can be made that no tribal powers are inherent.
This Article argues, however, that tribes may continue to
enjoy the inherent power to govern tribal members. Going
further, some commentators have interpreted Cohen's princi-
ples to mean that tribes have inherent sovereignty over non-
members as well.6  But, even assuming arguendo that
Congress, or one of its duly constituted arms, has never fully
extinguished tribal powers of self-government," in no way
does that assumption lead to the conclusion that tribes enjoy
extra-constitutional power over nonmembers. The treaties
promised land to the Indians for their "exclusive use"-a
promise of complete separation and nonintercourse with non-
Indians. The treaties did not envision that non-Indians would
live and do business on the reservations under the current
checkerboard land ownership patterns that exist within the
reservations today.' Thus, it is disingenuous to suggest that
within whose territory the tribe occupies the land, and so far only as that law
recognizes it").
60. See infra notes 124-149 and accompanying text.
61. See Duro v. Reina, 110 S.Ct. 2053 (1990); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191 (1978).
62. The issue is not trivial. Clearly, a delegation of power is a state action and, as
such, would invoke constitutional scrutiny. If a power is deemed "inherent", then the
Court will apparently shield such a power from constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g.,
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
63. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323.
64. See, e.g., Collins, Implied Limitations On the Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes, 54
WASH. L. REv. 479, 510-13 (1979) [hereinafter Collins, Implied Limitations].
65. But see generally, infra notes 124-149 and accompanying text, and in particular
note 167.
66. As the Court recently recognized in Duro, Congress may not, even under its
treaty power, deprive any United States citizen of his or her constitutional rights.
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the treaties promised inherent power over nonmembers. In
effect, the treaties promised that the issue of such power
would simply not arise.
3. The Permanent-Separate-Extra-Constitutional View
6 7
Another theory along the continuum of competing views
of tribal governmental powers, we come to a third theory. The
Supreme Court once declared that "Indian tribes are states in a
certain domestic sense and for certain municipal purposes,
though not foreign states or States of the United States....,,
Professor Charles Wilkinson, however, would clarify that dec-
laration as follows: Indian tribes are "permanent, separate sov-
ereigns, a third level of government in this constitutional
democracy. 'e9  Wilkinson also asserts that tribal powers are
both preconstitutional and extra-constitutional. 70
Professor Wilkinson states that contemporary judges face
two divergent and irreconcilable lines of Indian law jurispru-
dence. He calls the first line, which traces to Supreme Court
decisions in United States v. Kagama,7' McBratney v. United
States,72 and Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,73 the "pragmatic and logi-
cal" line.7 4 The Supreme Court's more recent decisions in Oli-
phant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe75 and Duro v. Re/ha76 also fit
into that category. This first line is premised on modern reali-
ties. By setting the cases in contemporary social and economic
Duro, 110 S.Ct. at 2063. See also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988); Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1 (1957). If this is so, then Talton v. Mayes and its progeny should be reevaluated.
67. See C. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANs, TiME, AND THE LAw (1987), supra note
27. As an intellectual force favoring the expansion of tribal powers, Professor
Wilkinson is the heir apparent to Felix S. Cohen. Wilkinson served as one of the
principal editors of the 1982 edition of COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW.
The title of the 1982 edition is somewhat of a misnomer. In 1982 Felix S. Cohen was
long dead. The 1982 edition "is in no sense the work of Felix S. Cohen. It is neither a
facsimile reprint, a new edition, nor an updating of the Cohen work." Rarick, Felix S.
Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 1982 Edition (Book Review), 11 AM. INDIAN
L. REv. 85 (1983).
68. Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. 211 (1872); see also Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982) (referring to modern Indian tribes as carrying out "municipal
functions").
69. C. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 27, at 31.
70. Id. at 62.
71. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
72. 104 U.S. 621 (1882).
73. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
74. C. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 27, at 29.
75. 425 U.S. 191 (1978).
76. 110 S.Ct. 2053 (1990).
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conditions, courts following this line generally deny most pow-
ers of tribes and look to states, as more egalitarian and com-
prehensive governments, to exercise police power over non-
Indian and Indian citizens alike.
Professor Wilkinson terms the second line, which traces to
the Supreme Court decisions in Worcester v. Georgia,78 Ex
parte Crow Dog,79 and Talton v. Mayes,' ° the "pre-Columbian
line.""' The Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Wheeler"2 also fits into this second category. Courts following
the second line reject the modern realities as a premise and
apply an almost mechanical, linear analysis of whether rele-
vant attributes of preconstitutional sovereignty have been
extinguished or qualified by the United States. If not, the tri-
bal powers retain their preconstitutional status.s3
Although Wilkinson recognizes that the former line is
more in tune with the "forward-looking and progressive"
notions of common law jurisprudence that have served our
nation well, he rejects that line in favor of the second.8 4
"Damn the anomaly, damn the illogic of seating a nearly 'for-
eign' government in rural Minnesota, South Dakota, or for that
matter, downtown Tacoma, Washington."'
77. C. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 27, at 29.
78. 31 U.S. 515 (1832). Wilkinson's reading, and this classification of Worcester, is
questionable. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Worcester, and his other seminal
decisions in Indian law, properly belong to the more pragmatic group. Chief Justice
Marshall reached his decision in Worcester not on some platonic notion of inherent
sovereignty but on the "actual state of things." He reasoned inductively not
deductively. First, he examined the Constitution, the applicable statutes, and the
treaty itself. Then, he found that the federal treaty guaranteed the tribe the right to
govern itself (during the separationist policy of the nonintercourse era). Thus, he
concluded that the state of Georgia could not override the federal treaty. Perhaps
because of the named parties, the case is often miscited as involving state sovereignty
versus Indian tribal sovereignty. In fact, it involved Federalist issues-state
sovereignty versus federal sovereignty. Lest there be any further doubt that Chief
Justice Marshall took this view, and not the view of some modern tribal advocates, see
G. HAINES, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND
POLITICs-1789-1835, 597-605 (1944) (quoting correspondence by Chief Justice
Marshall, President John Quincy Adams, Justice Story, President Jackson and
Governor Lumpkin of Georgia).
79. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
80. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
81. C. WILKINSON, AMERIcAN INDIANs, supra note 48, at 29-30.
82. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
83. Id.
84. C. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 27, at 29-30.
85. C. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 27, at 30. Note that much of
downtown Tacoma sits within the original boundaries of the Puyallup reservation.
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Wilkinson's absolutist thesis of tribal governmental pow-
ers can be challenged on several grounds. First, as the legisla-
tion enacted during the termination period demonstrates,
Indian tribes are not necessarily permanent entities." Unlike
federal, state, and local governments, Indian tribes have no
constitutional peg upon which they can hang a right to perma-
nent entity status. Nonetheless, the tenth amendment has
been invoked by analogy to support the proposition that Indian
treaties reserve to the tribes those powers not expressly or
impliedly relinquished to the United States." The analogy
should be of little import to the modern tribes, however, due to
the 1985 emasculation of the tenth amendment in Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro Transit Authority. 9 Thus, although the
Constitution acknowledges Indian tribes,' the framers of the
Constitution did not envision Indian tribes as constituting a
third level of government or as permanent entities in our con-
stitutional democracy.91 Indeed, Professor Wilkinson concedes
According to 1980 census data, Indians comprise only about 3 percent of the citizen
population residing on the Puyallup reservation. See 1980 Census, supra note 3.
86. Broadly speaking, the termination period lasted from 1943 to 1961. Pursuant
to a congressional policy of assimilation, many reservations were disestablished with a
view toward making Indians subject to the same laws and entitled to the same
privileges and responsibilities as other citizens of the United States. See H.R. Con.
Res. 108, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 67 Stat. 132 (1953); F. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAw 170-175 (1982).
87. This is because "[C]ongress has plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate
the powers of local self-government which the tribes otherwise possess." Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978); see also Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982) (Indian tribal sovereignty is not derived from the
Constitution); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); Martone,
Congressional License?, supra note 22, at 603; C. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS,
supra note 27, at 103.
88. See infra notes 243-260 and accompanying text.
89. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
90. Only one provision in the Constitution directly relates to tribes. Article I, § 8,
cl. 3, the so-called Indian Commerce Clause, provides that "Congress shall have the
Power to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian tribes." Seizing upon the fact that Indian tribes are delineated
separately, Chief Justice Marshall concluded that they are not foreign nations.
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 18 (1831); see also Martone, Congressional
License?, supra note 22. Through the exercise of its article 1, section 8, power
Congress has preempted state regulation of Indian affairs. Article VI, § 2, cl.2,
provides that "all Treaties made . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land." Id.
Article I, § 2, cl.3 and its amended version, Article XIV, section 2, refer to "Indians not
taxed" for purposes of House of Representatives apportionment; however, these latter
provisions are largely irrelevant to Indian tribal power.
91. The Federalist Papers mentioned Indian tribes only four times. Two of these
comments were by Alexander Hamilton who argued that a standing peacetime army
was "indispensable... to guard against the ravages and depredations of the Indians."
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that "although a truly substantial portion of early federal busi-
ness involved Indian affairs, the Founding Fathers almost cer-
tainly assumed that tribes would simply die out under the
combined weight of capitalism, Christianity, and military
power.
92
Second, because the federal government invited non-Indi-
ans onto the reservations during the allotment era, many res-
ervations, especially those in the Northwest, are composed of
checkerboard land ownership. Therefore, many tribes are no
longer physically separated from nonmembers,93 as they were
during the Nonintercourse Act era. Furthermore, all Indians
were granted citizenship in 1924' and as a result, are no longer
as politically and culturally separate.
Third, while some tribal powers may retain their precon-
stitutional status,95 a host of recent decisions holds that tribal
sovereignty is no cornucopia of exclusive extra-constitutional
sovereignty over all people, property, or resources located
within the original reservation boundaries.' Not completely
unsympathetic to the plight of nonmembers on the reserva-
THE FEDERALIST, No. 24 115 (Beloff)) (1987); see also id. No. 25, at 120 (Hamilton
speaks of British and Spanish territories and the Indian nations as common dangers).
John Jay mentioned Indian tribes once, and then merely as an example where a
strong federal government would be better suited to maintain peaceful relations "than
several lesser ones." Id. No. 3, at 11. Finally, James Madison observed that the Indian
Commerce Clause corrected the defect in the Articles of Confederation which had
limited federal jurisdiction to Indians not members of any State. Id. No. 42, at 215-16.
Note: The defect appeared in Article IX, paragraph 4 of the Articles of Confederation.
92. C. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 27, at 103; see also 3 J. KENT,
COMMENTARIES 318 (1st ed. 1828) (predicting the imminent demise of all Indian tribes).
93. See discussion infra notes 124-149 and accompanying text.
94. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401(b) (1982)).
95. Preconstitutional powers are limited to matters of self-government, that is,
control over internal affairs. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the
Yakima Nation, 109 S.Ct. 2994 (1989). Thus, the Court has held that Congress has not
extinguished tribal power to punish offenses against tribal law committed by tribal
members. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 328 (1978); Ex parte Crow Dog, 109
U.S. 556 (1883). Nor has Congress extinguished exclusive tribal jurisdiction over
adoption proceedings where all parties are tribal members and reservation residents.
Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976); Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield, 109 S.Ct. 1597 (1989) (federal Indian child welfare Act definition of
"domicile" pre-empts state law; tribal member mother may not avoid exclusive tribal
jurisdiction over adoption proceedings merely by giving birth off-reservation).
96. See Duro v. Reina, 110 S.Ct. 2053 (1990); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes &
Bands of the Yakima Nation, 109 S.Ct. 2994 (1989); Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983);
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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tions, however, Professor Wilkinson does suggest limited judi-
cial review when ICRA rights are alleged to be abridged by
tribes7
4. The Full Sovereignty and Independence View
Some commentators argue that even today some Indian
tribes meet the international law statehood test and, under the
principle of self-determination, should be given an opportunity
to secede from the Union to form independent nations.98
These commentators morally and factually dispute the tradi-
tional legal rationales restricting Indian tribal sovereignty: (1)
discovery and occupation; (2) conquest; (3) cession and agree-
ment; (4) acquisitive prescription; and (5) changed
circumstances. 99
97. C. WLKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 27, at 115.
98. Clinebell & Thomson, Sovereignty and Sef-Determination: The Rights of
Native Americans Under International Law, 27 BuFFALO L. REV. 669 (1978)
[hereinafter Clinebell & Thompson, Sovereignty and Sef-Determination]. See also
McSloy, An Argument For Nationhood, supra note 27.
99. In terms of historical reality, however, none of the arguments against these
traditional rationales are very persuasive. First, to refute the occupation and
acquisitive prescription rationales, it is necessary to ignore that for over 100 years
many non-Indians have owned and lived on non-Indian lands owned in fee simple
within original reservation boundaries. The current checkerboard land-holding
patterns on reservations cannot be so summarily dismissed.
Second, in discussing the conquest rationale, Clinebell and Thomson posit
contradictory statements. Compare the statement that "[m]any native nations were
never subdued by military force" with the statement that "the U.S. has throughout its
history used physical force and violence to drive Indians from their land." Clinebell &
Thomson, supra note 98, at 688-89. Moreover, even if some Indian tribes were not
"conquered" in the true sense of the word, if any tribe were to attempt to secede from
the Union now, surely it would be. In other words, the "legal sovereignty" of Indian
tribes is dependent upon their "political sovereignty." BROWN, THE AUSTINIAN
THEORY OF LAw 271-81 (reprinted 1926).
Third, in their discussion of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAw § 153 principle, rebus sic stantibus (literally, "at this point of affairs"), Clinebell
and Thomson fail to grapple with the exception to the qualification: where the change
in circumstances is consistent with the purposes of the agreement, then rebus sic
stantibus validly applies even if such a change is brought about by the party seeking to
invoke it. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 153 comment c.
Long before the allotment acts, Chief Justice Marshall deemed Indian tribes to be "in
a state of pupilage" and "wards" of the United States. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. 1, 17 (1831). The allotment acts were an attempt to teach the Indian "pupils" the
benefits of individual property ownership. Because the allotment acts were not
enacted in bad faith, these sovereign acts of the United States were "consistent with
the purpose of the agreement." Thus, the allotment acts affecting Indian reservations
are sustainable under the doctrine of changed circumstances and the principle of rebus
sic stantibus.
Finally, it would be remiss here to fail to point out the well settled principle that
the validity of a state action must be judged by the legal standards in effect at the time
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The full sovereignty theory is not novel. In 1831, two pro-
ponents of this full sovereignty view sat on the Supreme
Court. Speaking for himself and Justice Story in a dissent to
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,1 ' Justice Thompson stated:
"[t]esting the character and condition of the Cherokee Indians
by [E. de Vattel's indicia of statehood], it is not perceived how
it is possible to escape the conclusion that they form a sover-
eign State."' 0'1 Thompson argued that since 1775, the executive
and legislative branches had regarded Indian tribes "not only
as sovereign and independent, but as foreign nations or tribes,
not within the jurisdiction nor under the government of the
States within which they were located."'1 2 Even though these
full sovereignty and independence arguments may have intel-
lectual appeal, however, they have never commanded a major-
ity on the Court.10 3
of the action. Clinebell and Thomson concede that "[p]rior to the 20th century,
international law used the rule of force and physical power as the foundation for
international relations." Clinebell & Thomson, Sovereignty and SeLf-Determination,
supra note 98, at 700. Therefore, in inviting non-Indians onto the reservations
pursuant to the allotment acts, Congress met both the standards of international law
and the standards set by Chief Justice Marshall more than a half century earlier.
100. 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
101. Id. at 53. Thompson also queries: "If the Cherokee were then [prior to 1492]
a foreign nation, when or how have they lost that character, and ceased to be a distinct
people, and become incorporated with any other community?" Clinebell & Thomson,
Sovereignty and SeVf-Determination, supra note 98, at 700. Apparently, Thomson
would answer: "So long as they are permitted to maintain a separate and distinct
government; it is their political condition that constitutes their foreign character ......
Id.
102. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 59 (1831). A modern commentator
makes a similar argument in a recent article attacking the plenary power doctrine.
McSloy, An Argument for Nationhood, supra note 27.
103. In this regard, Chief Justice Marshall's 1831 opinion in Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia merits quoting in full:
[I]t may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the
acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy, be
denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be
denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which
we assert a title independent of their will which must take effect in point of
possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a
state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward
to his guardian.
They look to our government for protection; rely on its kindness and its
power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the President as their
great father. They and their [Indian] country are considered by foreign
nations, as well as by ourselves, as being so complete under the sovereignty
and dominion of the United States, that any attempt to acquire their lands, or
to form a political connection with them, would be considered by all as an
invasion of our territory, and an act of hostility.
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17-18.
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III. THE EXERCISE OF CONGRESSIONAL PLENARY POWER
OVER INDIAN AFFAIRS
Ever since the landmark opinion in Worcester v. Geor-
gia l 4 there has been little dispute that Congress maintains ple-
nary power over Indian affairs."0 5 Chief Justice Marshall
stated that "[the Constitution] confers on Congress the powers
of war and peace; of making treaties, and of regulating com-
merce ... with the Indian tribes. These powers comprehend
all that is required for the regulation of our intercourse with
Indians."' 6 Federal plenary power over Indians is a major
doctrine in Indian law today.0 7
Although tribalism traces to pre-Columbian origins, tribal
powers are now subject to complete defeasance by Congres-
sional exercise of plenary power. For more than two hundred
years, Congress has exercised its plenary power in various and
often conflicting ways.0 8 This Article will focus on one of the
byproducts of inconsistent Indian law and policy making: the
conflicting promises made by the federal government to Indi-
ans in the treaties and to non-Indians in the allotment acts.
Further, this Article will examine the attempted Congres-
sional reconciliaton of those promises as embodied in the legis-
lative history of the Wheeler-Howard Act.
A. The First Promise: The Treaties in Light of the
Nonintercourse Acts
The United States Senate ratified 370 Indian treaties" 9
104. 31 U.S. 515 (1832)
105. See Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and
Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195 (1984).
106. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 543. In that same opinion, Marshall also explained that
"[p]ower, war, conquest, give rights, which, after possession, are conceded by the
world; and which can never be controverted by those on whom they descend." Id. See
also Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375
(1886). C. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 27, at 78.
107. "[T]he power of the Federal Government over Indian tribes is plenary."
National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 851 (1985). See
also 1 AMERICAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 106-07 (1977).
108. For a more complete compilation of all American Indian treaties, consult
either C. KAPPLER, LAWS AND TREATIES (Vols. 1 & 2, 1902) (Vol. 3, 1913) (Vol. 4, 1929),
or Institute For the Development of Indian Law, Inc., A Chronological List of Treaties
and Agreements Made by Indian Tribes with the United States (1973). For a
compilation of congressional acts concerning Indian affairs, consult Jones, American
Indian Policy: Background, Nature, History, Current Issues, Future Trends,
Congressional Research Service (March 12, 1987).
109. HOUSE COMM. OF INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 88TH CONG., 2D SESS., LIST
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before 1871, the year Congress abolished the making of any
further treaties with Indian tribes."n  Viewed in the light of
overall Indian policy of the times, as exemplified by the
nonintercourse acts, the treaty promises made to Indian tribes
were simply this: All land reserved to Indian tribes would be
for their "exclusive use and benefit.""' To ensure this exclu-
sivity, the treaties generally forbade non-Indians to "pass over,
settle upon, or reside in the reservations.""' 2 Although some
treaties used slightly different language," 3 the basic promise
made to all the tribes was the same-retained powers of self-
government over tribal members in Indian country." 4
Early federal Indian policy was directed from a military
standpoint and, accordingly, must be evaluated as such.
Indeed, following the adoption of the Constitution, one of the
first congressional acts vested authority over Indian affairs in
the Department of War." 5 To avoid the expense and strain of
long drawn-out Indian wars, President Washington and Secre-
tary of War Knox followed the practice of Great Britain of
negotiating treaties with tribes."16
The early treaties also must be evaluated in light of
another important early federal policy-the regulation of trade
between Indians and non-Indians. Through the use of treaties
and the enactment of sporadic nonintercourse acts," 7 the fed-
OF INDIAN TREATIES 1-6 (Comm. Print No. 33, 1964); see also Martone, Congressional
License?, supra note 22, at 605.
110. "Hereinafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United
States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power
with whom the United States may contract by treaty .... ." 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1970)
(originally enacted as Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544).
111. See, e.g., Treaty with the Yakimas, 12 Stat. 951 (1859).
112. Id. This language merely duplicated what was already federal law under the
nonintercourse acts.
113. E.g., Second Treaty of Fort Laramie, 15 Stat. 549 (1868) ("absolute and
undisturbed use"); Treaty with Navajo, 15 Stat. 667 (1868) (same); Treaty of Medicine
Creek, 10 Stat. 1132 (1854) (same).
114. "Indian country" was defined as property "to which the Indian title has not
been extinguished." Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (repealed in part)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 25 U.S.C.); see also Bates v. Clark,
95 U.S. 204, 208 (1877) (clearing up potential ambiguity in statute by ruling that the
definition applies to all lands, whether east or west of the Mississippi River); United
States v. Chavez, 290 U.S. 357, 364 (1933); Federal Indian Law, United States Dept. of
Interior 309-310 (1966).
115. See, e.g., 1 Stat. 49 (1789).
116. See F. PRUCHA, AMEiCAN INDLAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS 44
(1962).
117. See, e.g., Trade and Intercourse Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1976)). This act and its progeny required
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eral government achieved reasonable success towards its twin
goals of ensuring westward settlement and minimizing conflict.
The principal policy tool was simply the separation of Indians
from non-Indians."'
As the march towards manifest destiny quickened in pace,
the inadequacy of a piecemeal legislative approach towards
Indian affairs became apparent. In 1834 Congress enacted its
first truly comprehensive piece of Indian legislation; it was
aptly titled "An Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse with
Indian Tribes and to Preserve Peace on the Frontiers."' "
According to Martone, the Act:
provided licensing for trade with Indians, prohibited non-
Indians from bartering with Indians for hunting and cooking
items, prohibited non-Indians from hunting in Indian coun-
try, prohibited non-Indians from grazing their animals in
Indian country, prohibited settlement in Indian land, prohib-
ited the conveyance of Indian land except by federal treaty,
prohibited speeches in or messages to Indian country
designed to disturb the peace, and extended federal criminal
jurisdiction to all crimes committed in Indian country except
as 'to crimes committed by one Indian against the person or
property of another Indian.
'12 °
To administer the Act, Congress formally established the
Department of Indian Affairs.1
2 '
All of the American Indian treaties were negotiated dur-
ing the time of the federal policy of complete separation of
non-Indians from Indians and Indian country (as embodied in
the Nonintercourse Act of 1834 and its predecessors). Had the
measured separatism envisioned by the treaties and
nonintercourse acts continued, the civil war concerning the
extent of tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians122 would not
federal consent for all Indian alienation of land. Note that "between the years 1802
and 1813, no federal legislation existed regulating affairs with Indians." Martone,
Congressional License?, supra note 22, at 608.
118. See F. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS, 1-3
(1962).
119. Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of Title 25, United States Code).
120. Martone, Congressional License?, supra note 22, at 609.
121. 4 Stat. 735 (June 3, 1834). This department stayed within the Department of
War until 1848 when control over Indian affairs was transferred to the Department of
the Interior. 9 Stat. 395 (Feb. 2, 1848).
122. See T. Malone, The Role of Indian Tribes in Our Constitutional System-Two
Persistent Problems 2 (unpublished manuscript on file with UPS Law Review).
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exist today. No non-Indians would reside or do business on the
reservations. "The only non-Indians [on reservations] would
be, for the most part, federal officials with the Indian Service
and federally licensed Indian traders."' 23 However, federal
Indian policy changed dramatically during the 1880s.
B. The Second Promise: The Allotment Acts
By the 1880s, America had achieved its so-called manifest
destiny. "The Indian wars were nearly at an end, the tribes
were subjugated, and westward expansion was complete."'"
In this dawn of a new era, a different federal Indian policy
emerged. Congress embarked upon a policy of assimilation,
what today might be called "Americanization." This policy was
to be implemented primarily by education, allotment to Indi-
ans of lands in severalty, and the eventual destruction of tribal
government. 2 '
As early as 1880, bills were introduced in Congress that
generally provided for the allotment of reservation lands to
Indians.126 The Court in Montana v. United States127 recog-
nized that the legislative history of S. 1773, a bill substantially
similar to the General Allotment Act,' sheds light on the
purpose of the various allotment acts."2 The members of the
Senate, at the outset and throughout the legislative debates,
clearly understood that the purpose of the allotment acts was
to "civilize" Indians-in part by dissolution of tribal rela-
tions.13° For example, Senator Saunders stated early in the
debates on S. 1773:
Heretofore we have recognized the tribal relations .... But
now a new order of things is about to be established, as I
understand. The people of this country are in favor largely,
123. Id. at 3.
124. Martone, Congressional License?, supra note 22, at 610.
125. See, e.g., Reports of the Secretary of the Interior: (1885) pp. 25-28; (1886) p. 4;
(1988) pp. XXIX-XXXII; (1894) p. iv; Reports of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs:
(1887) pp. IV-X; (1889) pp. 3-4; (1890) pp. VI, XXXIX; (1891) pp. 3-9, 26; (1892) p. 5.
126. See H.R. 5038, 46 Cong., 2d Sess. (1880); S. 1773, 46th Cong., 3d Sess. (1880).
127. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
128. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 390 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1970)).
129. Montana, 450 U.S. at 559 n.9; see also United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535,
543 n.4 (1980).
130. See, e.g., 11 CONG. REC. 779 (Statement of Sen. Vest), 782 (Sen. Coke), 733-84
(Sen. Saunders), 785 (Sens. Morgan and Hoar), 881 (Sen. Brown), 906 (Sen. Butler),
939 (Sen. Teller), 1003 (Sen. Morgan), 1028 (Sen. Hoar), 1064 and 1065 (Sen. Plumb),
1067 (Sen. Williams).
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in my opinion, of giving the Indians the rights of citizenship,
of making them citizens, and requiring of them all that is
required of others ... I only wanted to say that I favor the
principle of the bill, that I wish it to be known that I am in
favor of dividing the lands up into severalty to these people,
and favor of the earliest possible breaking up of the tribal
relation and making them citizens in every sense of the
word.
13 1
As part of the effort to Americanize the Indian allotees,
the bill expressly provided that, upon issuance of the patent
for the allotment, the Indian allotee was to become subject to
the laws of the territory or state in which the allotment was
situated.1 32 Thus, the extension of state jurisdiction was to
result in the termination of tribal jurisdiction.1 33 Moreover,
Congress intended that the Americanization of the Indian pop-
ulation would be facilitated in part by non-Indians who would
settle upon the surplus and alienated allotted lands and would
thus expose the Indian allotees to the virtues of private prop-
erty ownership and the ways of "civilization."'"
The underlying understanding and intent of S. 1773 was
carried forth into the bill that was ultimately enacted in 1887,
the General Allotment (Dawes) Act.13  Senator Dawes, the
author of and one of the primary spokesman for the General
Allotment Act, stated that "this... very important bill... has
been considered, as I have already said, a great many times in
131. 11 CONG. REC. at 783-84.
132. S. 1773, § 6. See II CONG. REC. 778-79 (Sen. Coke), 875 (Sen. Hoar), 878 (Sen.
Coke), 1029 (Sen. Plumb), 1066 (Sen. Kerman), 1067 (Sen. Morgan).
133. As stated by Sen. Hoar during the debates on S. 1773:
An Act of Congress may undoubtedly take away that shield, may destroy the
tribal relation, and very likely do what this statute in express terms
undertakes to do-that is, subject the Indian to State law...
So if you make an Indian subject to the law of the State, it is not by limiting
or by extending the operation of that law; it is by taking away from the Indian
the tribal character.
11 CONG. REC. at 1028.
134. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 554, 560 n.9 (1981). See also 11 CONG.
REc. 876 (Sen. Morgan), 877 (Sen. Hoar); XVII CONG. REc. 1762-63 (Sens. Teller and
Dawes); Reports of the Secretary of the Interior. (1891), p. vi; (1892), p. xxxiii; Report
of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs (1891), pp. 46-47; Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481,
496 (1973); Collins, Implied Limitations on the Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes, 54 WASH.
L. REv. 479, 506-07 (1979) [hereinafter Collins, Implied Limitations] ("[A]llotment
schemes directly contemplated non-Indian settlement within the reservation on what
was deemed to be "surplus" Indian land and the resulting integration was an
affirmative policy of the government."
135. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 25 U.S.C.).
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the Senate."'" The importance of this act cannot be overem-
phasized: it ushered in "the most critical period in the whole
history of Indian-White relations in the United States.' 3 7
The current civil war over the scope of tribal authority is
largely attributable to the opening of reservations to non-
Indian settlement. The congressional intent behind the federal
policy of allotment and assimilation is extremely important
because Congress surely knew that it would lead to the devel-
opment of many predominantly non-Indian towns and commu-
nities.138 In repudiating its first promise, Congress did not
intend that Indian tribes would retain inherent or treaty-
reserved tribal authority to exercise general governmental
power over non-Indian reservation residents.13 9 The Supreme
Court recognized as much in Montana v. United States: 4
There is simply no suggestion in the legislative history
that Congress intended that the non-Indians who would set-
tle upon alienated allotted lands would be subject to tribal
regulatory authority. Indeed, throughout the congressional
debates, allotment of Indian land was consistently equated
with dissolution of tribal affairs and jurisdiction [citations
omitted]. It defies common sense to suppose that Congress
would intend that non-Indians purchasing allotted lands
would become subject to tribal jurisdiction when an avowed
purpose of the allotment policy was the ultimate destruction
of tribal government.14'
The General Allotment Act and its progeny modified,"4 if
not completely destroyed, the treaty promise of exclusive tribal
use of, and benefit from, all lands within the exterior bounda-
ries of Indian reservations. 143 In its stead, Congress made new
136. 17 CONG. REC. 1559.
137. C. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 27, at 19 (citing F. PRUCHA,
AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN CRISIS-CHRISTIAN REFORMERS AND THE INDIAN, 1865-
1900 (1987)).
138. Indeed, to aid this development, Congress enacted legislation permitting
rights-of-way for highways to be established on Indian lands and the condemnation of
individual Indian lands for public purposes. Act of March 3, 1901, 31 Stat. 1083, §§ 3-4,
25 U.S.C. §§ 311, 357 (1982).
139. The general allotment act did not delegate or congressionally license any
such powers.
140. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
141. Montana, 450 U.S. at 560 n.9, cited with approval in Brendale v. Confederated
Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Nation, 109 S.Ct. 2994 (1989).
142. C. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 27, at 19 (opening the
reservations modified the treaty promise of a "measured separatism").
143. "[Treaty rights with respect to reservation lands must be read in light of the
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promises to non-Indian American citizens. Whatever the wis-
dom of the policy in retrospect,
the fact remains that the United States invited its citizens to
homestead Indian land and that non-Indians accordingly
built homes and livelihoods within reservation boundaries.
If many entered by means of illicit if not illegal transactions
born of avarice, many others came simply in pursuit of hon-
est dreams opened up in the homestead policy.'"
In the face of conflicting federal promises, the task of the
modern Court is to make a just reconciliation of competing
federal, tribal, and state interests. 45 The Court could do this
in one of two ways. First, the Court could strike the balance
itself by fashioning some sort of federal common law of tribal
sovereignty. Second, it could attempt to discern the intent of
Congress, as embodied in specific statutes and treaties, with
the concept of tribal sovereignty providing only a "backdrop"
for the interpretive process."4 If, as the Court suggests, the
latter method is the proper approach, 147 then the Court should
heed Justice Blackmun's advice and "direct its attention not to
the intent of the (General Allotment) Dawes Act, but rather to
the intent of the Congress that repudiated the Dawes Act, and
established the Indian policies to which we are heir"' 4S-the
Wheeler-Howard (Indian Reorganization) Act of 1934.149
Although Justice Blackmun points to the right statute, he
chose the wrong interpretation. The correct interpretation
would recognize that the Wheeler-Howard Act both confirmed
the second promise, that promise made to non-Indians in the
allotment acts, and partially restored the first promise, the
subsequent alienation of those lands." Montana, 450 U.S. at 561; see also Brendale, 109
S.Ct. at 3004; Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dept. of Game of Washington, 433 U.S. 165, 174
(1977).
144. C. WILKINsON, AMERICAN INDIANs, supra note 27, at 23. The quote continues:
"Doubtless there are cases where homesteaders were altogether oblivious of the fact
that their new homes were within Indian reservations. These settlers came As families
to open new land, not to do business with Indians." Id.
145. See McCoy, The Doctrine of Tribal Sovereignty: Accommodating Tribal,
State, and Federal Interests, 13 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 357 (1978).
146. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (proper
approach is to ascertain how Congress has struck the balance, with concept of tribal
sovereignty providing only a "backdrop".)
147. Id. Note that this is also the approach taken by Chief Justice Marshall in his
much cited opinion in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
148. Brendale, 109 S.Ct. at 3025 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
149. Id.
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promise of self-government made to the Indian tribes in the
treaties.
C. The Reconcilation: The Wheeler-Howard (Indian
Reorganization) Act
The original Wheeler-Howard Act, now commonly
referred to as the IRA or Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,
was an extremely comprehensive and controversial piece of
legislation. It contemplated a major reversal of federal Indian
policy. Perhaps for that reason, the original bill was aban-
doned in favor of an extensively revised bill.
Although the Chairman of the Committee on Indian
Affairs, Mr. Howard, stated that "[i]t is doubtful if any piece of
legislation in the history of the country has been more thor-
oughly and intelligently studied and debated..., ,,s surpris-
ingly, there has been no definitive construction of the Act.15 '
Perhaps this explains the myth that persists in surrounding it.
1. The Myth
The stated purposes of the Wheeler-Howard Act as
enacted was to extend to tribal governments the right to form
businesses and other organizations and to grant certain rights
of home rule. 5 2 Nonetheless, some academic commentators
contend that the Act was a congressional affirmation of the
existing retained sovereignty of the tribes. 5 3 For example,
Professor Collins, a strong supporter of the full sovereignty
view of tribal government power, contends that, in spite of the
workings of the allotment acts, in 1934 tribes maintained
inherent sovereignty "over all the lands of the reservation,
whether owned by the tribe, by members thereof, or by outsid-
ers.' 154 If this proposition were true, however, it would not
have been necessary to enact the legislation at all.
By halting the allotment process, the Wheeler-Howard Act
150. 78 CONG. REC. 11,731 (1934).
151. C. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 27, at 68 n.82.
152. See Act of June 18, 1834, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984.
153. See Collins, Implied Limitations, supra note 64, at 510; see also Comment,
Tribal Self-Government, supra note 26, at 969; C. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS,
supra note 27, at 68.
154. See Powers of Indian Tribes, supra note 27 (opinion written by Felix S.
Cohen after defeat of his original Wheeler-Howard Act in Congress) cited with
approval in Brendale, 109 S.Ct. at 3025 (Blackmun, J. dissenting). For the history of
that defeat, see infra notes 155-198 and accompanying text.
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reversed much of the pre-1934 federal Indian policy. But, it did
not turn the Indian policy clock back to pre-allotment act
times and fully restore the first promise. Rather, as will be
shown, the legislation- was an attempt to reconcile the two
promises.
2. The Legislative History
In his opening remarks concerning the original bill, the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John Collier, explained that
"[t]he point of departure for this legislation is the land-holding
system of the Indians within the allotted areas.... The allot-
ment was a cruel but well-meant scheme to make [the Indian]
abandon his tribal relations."'' L5
As explained further in the legal memorandum accompa-
nying the original bill:
[T]he bill is not limited to the correction of the allotment
system and restoration of lands to Indians.
It deals with a number of matters which are of intense
concern to all Indians without exception.
The first of these is Indian self-government or home
rule, or participation in Indian business. At present, such
self-government or participation as the Indians may enjoy is
a matter of privilege exclusively. It depends upon the whim
of the administration. Fundamentally, under existing law,
156
the Government's Indian Service is a system of
absolutism.1 57
In both the Senate and the House of Representatives, the
bill received unprecedented attention. In the House alone, the
Committee on Indian Affairs held 29 different sessions on the
155. Readjustment of Indian Affairs: Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the House
Committee on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 29-30 (1934) [hereinafter "1934
House Hearings"].
156. Cf. Powers of Indian Tribes, 1 Op. Solic. Gen. at 447 (self-government is not a
privilege, but a right), discussed infra pp. 33-36.
157. 1934 House Hearings, supra note 155, at 18; see also Readjustment of Indian
Affairs: Hearings on S. 2755 Before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess., 63-64 (1934) [hereinafter "1934 Senate Hearings") ("At present the
Indians . . . are under the almost unconditioned discretionary authority of the
Secretary of the Interior. He may be benevolent and wise; he may not be. But, in any
event, he is an absolutist. The law makes him that. That is why the Indians are
unorganized today ... We may extend to them the right or organize, the right to do
their own thinking, and their own work, and our successors can take it away. [The
Indian] has no rights .... Even the making of contracts by ward Indians is subject to
the Secretary of the Interior." Statement of John Collier, Commissioner of Indian
Affairs.
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bill." In these sessions the original bill was subjected to rigor-
ous study and debate.'59 And, after this study and debate, the
bill's objectionable features were eliminated."6
Among the provisions that Congress stripped from the
original bill were: (1) the municipal power of an Indian tribe
to pass ordinances affecting nonmembers of the tribe; and (2)
the power of local Indian courts to enforce these ordinances
against nonmembers residing within the Indian community.
"It was so drastically amended that they took out everything
but the title."' 6'
In spite of these drastic amendments, modern commenta-
tors continue to refer to the original bill as the key to under-
standing the "objectives and philosophy" behind the final
legislation. 62 As Congressman Ayers of Montana pointed out
on the floor, however, the original bill "was never Wheeler's or
Howard's baby-it was laid on their doorstep, and they have
cast it off and brought forth legitimate offspring.""
This Article's examination of the Wheeler-Howard Act
and its legislative history illustrates two important points.
First, with respect to the unallotted reservation lands, the Act
restored the original treaty promise of "exclusive use and ben-
efit." The Wheeler-Howard Act ensured that there would be
no further shrinkage of the Indian land base. Second, with
respect to the reservation lands owned in fee simple by non-
members, the Act affirmed the second promise that non-Indi-
ans would be free from tribal governmental control.
a. The Original Wheeler-Howard Act
Drafted within the Department of the Interior,'64 the orig-
inal bill was organized into four separate titles: Title I-Indian
158. 78 CONG. REc. 11,726 (1934).
159. Id. at 11,731 (statement of Mr. Howard).
160. Id. at 11,124 (statement of Senator Wheeler).
161. Id. at 9268 (statement of Mr. Peavey).
162. Comment, Tribal Self-Government, supra note 26, at 962-963.
163. 78 CONG. REC. at 12,165. (Compare the original bill, introduced as H.R. 7902
and S. 2755, with the bill passed by Congress, S. 3645.)
164. Cohen's 1942 Handbook explains the background of the legislation as follows:
When Harold L. Ickes was appointed Secretary of the Interior in 1933, he
chose Professor Nathan Margold to be his Solicitor. Margold asked Felix
Cohen, whose talents and work he had known for years, to give up a year of
private practice to help draft basic legislation which would transfer to Indian
tribes and individual Indians greater authority over their economic and
political affairs. The act, originally called The Wheeler-Howard Act, later
became known as the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.
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Self-Government; Title II-Special Education for Indians; Title
III-Indian Lands; and Title IV-Court of Indian Affairs. Title
I, "Indian Self-Government," was the heart of the original bill.
Congressman Hastings, an enrolled Cherokee tribal member,
summed up his extensive analysis"a of Title I as follows:
There are many ... details provided in title I, but to sum
them all up it would permit segregating one or more or any
number of areas as chartered communities within any state
and granting to the members of the respective chartered
communities, to all intents and purposes, the authority and
powers exercised by Indian tribes a century ago. And
Congress would be asked to make all necessary appropria-
tions to pay the necessary expenses of these separate
governments.16
Under section 2 of title 1, the Secretary of the Interior
would have been given authority to issue charters creating and
transferring to Indian communities "any and all such powers
of government as may [have] seem[ed] fitting in light of the
experience, capacities, and desires of the Indians concerned.'
'1 67
165. See generally 78 CONG. REC. 9265-71 (1934).
166. 78 CONG. REc. 9266 (1934).
167. As the following exchange further illustrates, the bill was presented to
Congress as an executive transfer of governmental power over Indian affairs-it was
not a confirmation of inherent tribal sovereignty:
Mr. O'Malley. Here is what I would like to know. It says:
It is hereby declared that those functions of government now exercised over
Indian reservations shall be gradually relinquished to the Indian?
What, broadly, are all those functions?
Mr. Collier. That is understood by crossing over to the specifications in
section 4. Might I say in advance of coming to that section, that it specifies
powers which may be given to the chartered communities. I take it that the
intent there is to say that this very wide range of discretion which we took not
of at the least hearing, the discretionary power now vested in the Secretary of
the Interior, shall gradually be transferred to the Indian community...
1934 House Hearings, supra note 155, at 179 (emphasis supplied). See also 1934 Senate
Hearings, supra note 157, at 67-68 ("We [the Indian Bureau] do all the things which
are listed in that long list you read [in Section 4; Title 1]." Statement of John Collier,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs).
One example of the wide range of discretion which Commissioner Collier referred
to above is as follows:
Let me illustrate and cite a concrete case which can happen anywhere in the
Indian country .... In January 1923 .... the Secretary of the Interior by one
flat smashed in the Navajo tribal government. It ceased to exist .... He wiped
it out and dictated a new Navajo tribal council.
Id. at 37.
Thus, Congress, by delegating its plenary power over Indian Affairs to the Depart-
ment of the Interior, had allowed the extinguishment of all retained sovereign powers
of even the most organized of Indian tribes. The IRA sought to change this bureau-
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Section 4 spelled out in more detail the powers that could be
included in these charters. The first is found in subsection (a):
To organize and act as a Federal municipal corporation, to
establish a form of government to adopt and thereafter
amend a constitution, and to promulgate, and enforce ordi-
nances and regulations for the effectuation of the functions
hereafter specified, and any other functions customarily
exercised by local governments. 168
Subsection (d) granted another important power:
To establish courts for the enforcement and administration
of ordinances of the community, which courts shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses of, and controversies
between members of the chartered community, and shall
have power to render and enforce judgments, criminal and
civil, legal and equitable, and to punish violations of local
ordinances by fine not exceeding $500, or in the alternative,
by imprisonment for a period of not exceeding six months
169
Title I made no provision for an appeal from the local
municipal court. 7 ° However, Title IV of the bill addressed this
concern by establishing a court of Indian affairs. Section 3,
subsection 4 of this Title spelled out the broad jurisdiction of
that court, which included jurisdiction "of all cases, civil or
criminal, arising under the laws and ordinances or a chartered
Indian community, wherein a real party in interest is not a
member of such community."
The drafter of the original bill, Felix Cohen, explained the
connection between the local court and the special Court of
Indian affairs:
The court of Indian affairs has general power to review deci-
sions of the local court wherever a person not a member of
the community is involved in the dispute. That is to say, if a
person not a member of the community enters the commu-
nity and commits any misdemeanor he may be tried by the
cratic absolutism--once the Secretary had issued a federal charter, only Congress
could revoke it.
168. 1934 House Hearings, supra note 155, at 2.
169. Id at 3.
170. Considered in light of Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978),
subsection (j) of the bill placed an interesting limitation on the enumerated powers:
"[t]o exercise any other powers, not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States, which may be necessary or incidental to the execution of the powers
above enumerated."
244 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 14:211
community court, but the Federal court has the power to
remove that case to the Federal court or to review the
case.1
71
Clearly, then, a chartered Indian community172 was to
have legislative jurisdiction over nonmembers residing within
it as broad as those of any municipal corporation or other unit
of local government.17  And, as Mr. Cohen testified, the local
tribal courts and the Court of Indian affairs would have broad
jurisdiction over nonmembers as well. 74 However, because of
the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs' objections, these pro-
visions were eliminated from the final bill.
b. Objections to the Original Wheeler-Howard Act
The exact reason for the committee's objections to the leg-
islative and judicial provisions is somewhat complicated. It was
generally conceded that the original bill might work on reser-
vations where Indian lands were already consolidated. But the
committee did not think it would work on checkerboarded res-
ervations, such as those in the Pacific Northwest.17' Respond-
ing to these objections, the chief spokesman for the original
171. 1934 House Hearings, supra note 155, at 80.
172. Definitions given in the original bill for "territory of a chartered community"
and "reservation" make two things clear. First, the "territory of a chartered
community" could be smaller than the limits of the original "reservation"; it could be a
subset. Second, fee patent lands owned by nonmembers would be construed to be
within the boundaries of the chartered Indian community and therefore subject to its
jurisdiction; provided if the charter was so defined. Title 1, § (13)(1)(m).
173. Indeed, as the following exchange illustrates, the jurisdiction of the Indian
communities would actually exceed the jurisdiction of traditional local governments:
The Chairman. The thing that puzzles me is just how far they can go under
this bill in setting up ordinances and laws which might conflict with the laws
of the State. Can you answer that, Mr. Commissioner.
Commissioner Collier. They could go, theoretically, just as far as they can go
without conflicting with existing Federal law, which is pretty far, Senator.
1934 Senate Hearings, supra note 157, at 177.
174. 1934 House Hearings, supra note 155, at 80.
175. An example of the committee consensus on this point is as follows:
Senator Thomas of Oklahoma. If the bill would not work in the Navajo
Reservation, where there is a great area populated exclusively by the Navajos,
I can hardly see where it could operate in a State like mine.... Then they
would be surrounded very likely with thickly populated white sections .... I
just cannot get through my mind how this bill can possibly be made to operate
in a State of thickly settled population. I think it may be all right in a place
like the Navajos, so far as I can see now, or the Menominees or the Klamaths.
The Chairman. I thought it would work among the Navajos and the Indians
in New Mexico and Arizona if it would work any place.
Id. at 145.
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bill, Commissioner Collier, assured the committee that tribal
jurisdiction over nonmembers would not be as extensive as it
appeared. The bill did not contemplate, for example, that an
Indian minority would exert jurisdiction over a non-Indian
majority. In the readjustment of Indian affairs, the Secretary
of the Interior would, pursuant to the provisions of the original
bill, take account of the fact that many Indian reservations had
substantial non-Indian populations. As Commissioner Collier
explained, "Title III [Indian Lands] is pretty closely linked
with Title I [Indian Self-Government]."' 76
Only when an extensive consolidation of both Indian land
and Indian population had been achieved would the tribe be
allowed to set up an "Indian community."'77 The original bill
set no specific guidelines as to just when there would be
enough consolidation to set up a self-governing community, but
Commissioner Collier assured Congress that "[tihis bill in Title
I deals with self-government of Indian tribes and provides that
an Indian community which has a solid geographic area may
have a court and enforce its laws through the court.' 178
The principal defect in the original bill was the uncer-
tainty as to which would come first-the consolidation of lands
or the federal municipal charter. As drafted, it appears that
this matter would be left to the Secretary of the Interior's dis-
176. Id. at 63.
177. The following exchange demonstrates the BIA's contemplation of a
consolidation of Indian land and population as a pre-condition of any issuance of a
municipal charter:
Commissioner Collier.... Now, let us look into the future. Here is what
might come about in a place like Montana. Going back to Mitle 3-T]itle 3
directs the Secretary of the Interior to proceed and demark those areas which
are to become consolidated areas, the areas within which an attempt is going
to be made to get the land consolidated into Indian-owned land. Where such a
consolidated area is big enough, the population in it homogeneous enough, the
time might come when it would want to set up a town government
Senator Thomas of Oklahoma. How do you proceed to get those lands in that
community?
Commissioner Collier. By purchases.
Senator Thomas of Oklahoma. Suppose you cannot purchase it; then what are
you going to do?
Commissioner Collier. We are out of luck.
Id. at 70-71.
See also Title III, § 8 ("any Indian tribe or chartered Indian community is author-
ized to purchase or otherwise acquire any interest of any member or nonmember in
land within its territorial limits... whenever.., necessary for the property consolida-
tion of Indian lands.") (emphasis supplied).
178. 1934 House Hearings, supra note 155, at 317.
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cretion.179 Depending upon the "experience, capacities, and
desires of the Indians concerned," the Secretary could sanction
all, some, or none of the enumerated powers mentioned in the
bill."' ° A major factor in this decision would be whether the
consolidation mechanism, a $2 million annual fund, had
brought about "unbroken areas of Indian land."''
Of course, there would be a recurring problem in creating
unbroken areas of land out of the existing checkerboards. As
the Commissioner explained, the Indian communities would
acquire by condemnation the fee lands owned by non-Indians
who were unwilling to sell.
It is difficult to see how it can be solved unless there could
be given to the Indian community the power of condemna-
tion to acquire the land necessary for consolidation. It raises
that question .... It is given in this bill, insofar as State
Laws permit condemnation, but there we may be up against
the limit.
1 8 2
The grand scheme was thus plagued by an inherent prob-
lem. Until a proper consolidation of tribally owned fee land
had occurred, the Secretary would supposedly grant only lim-
ited municipal powers to the Indian community.ls As Com-
missioner Collier stated:
It is perfectly evident that a group of Indians who are scat-
tered among whites, who are attending the public schools or
179. An Assistant Solicitor explained as follows:
Mr. Fahy. .. No specific powers are granted by the bill itself. Section 4 [of
Title 1] merely provides that the Secretary of the Interior may grant certain
chartered powers and that he may qualify those powers.
Id. at 327 (statement of Mr. Siegel).
180. Title I, § 2.
181. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs explained as follows:
Commissioner Collier. Now it is our idea that the land bought with this
appropriation [$2 million annually, Title III, § 7], if made, would first of all be
land within the checkerboard area; that we aim to consolidate the Indian
holdings so there will be unbroken areas of Indian land which would then be
held intact....
1934 Senate Hearings, supra note 157, at 59-60.
182. 1934 House Hearings, supra note 155, at 135 (emphasis supplied); see also id.
at 137.
183. The House of Representatives later eliminated the discretion of the Secretary
of the Interior on the matter by specifying criteria for consolidation. Under section 17
of the amended H.R. 7902, in order for an Indian tribe to even "organize for its
common welfare" or "adopt an appropriate constitution and bylaws", the Indian tribe
must have held at least 40 percent of the original land" in restricted or tribal status.
See H.R. REP. 1804, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1934). But note that it was ultimately the
Senate version which was enacted as the Wheeler-Howard Act.
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using the common institutions... would not form a territo-
rial government .. .They might do other things ... It is
equally evident that Indians living in great solid geographi-
cal areas would do precisely that."'
A proper consolidation was highly unlikely, however, unless
the Indian community was to receive a grant of what is poten-
tially one of the most oppressive of all sovereign powers-the
power of condemnation. Moreover, this oppressive power
would have to be exercised over nonmembers of the tribe.
The original bill contemplated that eventually, through
the consolidation process, checkerboarding on the reservations
would be eliminated. In the meantime, there would be a
"problem": Within the organized Indian communities marked
for consolidation, there would be non-Indian settlements that
would "kick like steers" if subjected to the jurisdiction of the
Indian courts.1 s
Chairman Wheeler, a former county prosecutor in Mon-
tana, had two main objections to the original bill. First, he was
worried that the Secretary of the Interior would not wait until
there was a solid block of Indian land and Indian population
before issuing the charters creating the Indian communities.
Second, he feared that establishing a "government within a
government" would lead to "conflicts in the Northwest
between the Indians and the whites." 186
184. 1934 Senate Hearings, supra note 157, at 67-68.
185. The following exchange depicts this jurisdictional problem:
Commissioner Collier. . . . Picture the condition. Let us take the Crow
Reservation and say that it does organize a community, gets a charter, an area
is marked out for consolidation, and you start getting the land. There will be
10 years in which there will be a large number of white settlements in there.
Now, what about this Court of Indian affairs? Is it going to have jurisdiction
over these white settlements?
Mr. Yellowtail [of the Crow Reservation]. That is another subject I was not
familiar with.
Commissioner Collier. I do not want to get away from that, because it is a
real problem.
Mr. Yellowtail. Yes; it is a real problem.
Commissioner Collier. By the language of this bill, as drawn, those white
settlements within the Indian community would be subject to the Federal
Court of Indian affairs [and the local Indian municipal courts] . . . [A] lot of
them are going to kick like steers when you try to subject them to that court.
1934 House Hearings, supra note 155, at 136.
186. The following exchange is just one example in the hearings where the
Chairman articulated his belief that the bill, if enacted as introduced, would lead to
conflicts:
The Chairman. But it seems to me-for instance, take your Montana
1991]
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Commissioner Collier tried to assuage these fears. For
example, he assured the committee that the Montana Indians,
"who [were] scattered among the whites, . . . would not
[attempt to] form a territorial government."' 7 But a represen-
tative of Montana's Blackfeet Tribe told the committee that
the Montana Indians would indeed attempt to form a tribal
government within the already existing county and state gov-
ernment, as a pertinent part of his testimony reveals:
Senator Thomas of Oklahoma. Which would you do? Would
you surrender your participation and activity in the present
set-up, or would you form a new charter, new form of gov-
ernment, and move over and get into that?
Mr. Brown [of the Blackfeet Tribe]. We would take both of
them. We would take both of them under the bill.'
What bothered the Senate committee about this arrange-
ment envisioned by the the Blackfeet representative was the
Indians-here is what you do: you say [reading Title 1, § 4, introduction to
(a)]:
Now, what do you mean by establishing a form of government?
Commissioner Collier. Municipal government.
The Chairman.... If that is true, you are going to let them [reading Title 1,
§ 4(b) through (g)-
In other words, you have practically delegated to the Indian Office all of the
powers and the right to execute any power not inconsistent with the
Constitution. Now, my own view about that matter is, as far as the Montana
Indians are concerned, that it would be a step backward for them rather than
a step forward.
Commissioner Collier. But Senator, the Montana Indians would not do that.
The Chairman. Well, you might possibly, Mr. Commissioner, get, for instance,
some tribe of Indians in Montana who would want to try this, and they might
get a sufficient number of signers to a petition to have a charter issued.
Commissioner Collier. Yes.
The Chairman. But if they did do it, in my judgment, it would bring about all
kinds of conflicts between your Indians and the white people, and in addition
to that, it would set back the Indians, in my judgment, considerably by doing
it, and I am afraid that would lead to conflicts in the Northwest between the
Indians and the whites.
I mean, supposing the Indian Bureau went out there, for instance, if you had
this provision in there; your Indian Bureau could go out there and take those
Indians possibly and propagandize them and get sufficient numbers of them to
sign it and issue a charter, and then attempt to set up this government within
a government out there which would be, in my judgmen4 a serious mistake
on the part the Indians to do it.
Now, I am not as familiar with the Indians down in the Southwest, and it
might be possible that it would work out all right for the Navajos.
1934 Senate Hearings, supra note 157, at 66 (emphasis supplied).
187. 1934 Senate Hearings, supra note 157, at 67.
188. Id at 170.
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fact that the Blackfeet Indians already dominated the existing
political community in their region, and in such a case the orig-
inal act piled another Indian-dominated system on top of the
existing system. 89 Thus, an irony of the original Wheeler-
Howard Act is that on those reservations where it might have
worked best-where the existing system of local government
was Indian-dominated-it was needed least. Further, the com-
mittee feared setting up an Indian community government that
might enact laws and ordinances that would conflict with those
governing that system."9 Precisely because of this fear, the
189. An illustration is as follows:
The Chairman.... Here you have at the present time some Indians in the
Blackfeet who are members of the school board; you have them running for
the legislature at times, and some of them have been elected to the
legislature, as I recall it.
Mr. Brown. Yes.
The Chairman. You have them holding county office positions and every
position of that kind, and you are taking part absolutely in the public life of
that whole community up there, and, in fact, the Indians practically dominate
it in that section of the country, don't they.
Mr. Brown. In that county.
Id. at 169.
190. The following exchange illustrates this concern:
Mr. Brown [of the Blackfeet Reservation]. You are fearful of the community
government part of it for us?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Brown. Rather than what we are permitted now?
The Chairman. Yes, because you are dominating the community up there
now. I mean the Indians practically run that community up there now. They
run the schools. They run the city and the county and they run the whole
community.
Mr. Brown. We are ready to just merge into this new proposition and take it
over [both the county government and the Indian government.]
Senator Thomas of Oklahoma. Well, then, if you take both, supposing the
laws under the Indian charter would be different from the laws under the
white Government?
Mr. Brown. We would take chances on what the law would be under the
community government, because we would make them. [Laughter.]
The Chairman. You might-I am not saying that you would, but you might-
set up laws which would absolutely be, and could set up laws which would
absolutely be, in conflict with the laws that govern your county at the present
time, and then you would immediately have conflict between the white people
and the Indians there. In my judgment, if you do that, if would bring about a
great deal of confusion and a great deal of bitterness and strife between the
two classes of people, which would be to the detriment, in my judgment, of
the Indians in the long run.
Mr. Brown.... I think we could amend that provision.
The Chairman. We will amend it.
Id. at 170-71. See also id. at 179, 198-200.
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provisions creating the new system were stricken.
c. The Revised Wheeler-Howard Act (S. 3645)
As finally enacted, the Wheeler-Howard Act did not spe-
cifically authorize the Secretary of the Interior to convey or
confirm any nonconsensual governmental power over Indians,
much less non-Indians. 9 ' In the words of Chairman Wheeler:
"[t]he Committee on Indian Affairs eliminated all those com-
pulsory provisions and eliminated from the bill as originally
presented the right of the Indians to make laws upon the res-
ervations."' 9  Thus, the 73rd Congress did not view the
Wheeler-Howard Act as a confirmation of "inherent tribal sov-
ereignty."'9 3 After being stripped of all its controversial provi-
sions, what the Act did do, primarily, was: (1) stop further
alienation of Indian lands; (2) provide for acquisition of land
for landless Indians; (3) stabilize the tribal organization by
vesting them with "real, though limited, authority, and by pre-
scribing conditions which must be met by such tribal organiza-
tions;"'" and (4) provide that "Indian tribes may equip
themselves with the devices of modern business organization
through forming into business corporations."' 95
191. The following exchange explains the intent of the amended section 3645
Wheeler-Howard Act:
Senator Frazier. If they set up a government they have the right to tax.
The Chairman. You are not setting up a government, in the first place, you
are simply vesting in the tribal council certain authority to make contracts.
But certainly when you come to give a tribal council the power to tax I do not
think it can be done.
Senator O'Mahoney. The point is that the member of any voluntary
organization could withdraw and could refuse to pay the assessment, but
under this, if Congress vests in the tribal council the right to levy or assess,
then the individual could not refuse to pay.
Id. at 249.
The assessment provision was stricken. From the hearings above, it is clear that
Congress intended that a recognized tribal member would be able to avoid the civil
regulatory jurisdiction of his own tribe by withdrawing his membership in the tribe.
Accord Wheeler-Howard Act- Interpretation, 1 Op. Solic. Gen. 484, 489-91 (Dept. Inte-
rior 1934). This view is consistent with the rationale behind the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Duro v. Reina, 110 S.Ct. 2053 (1990) (tribal authority rests on
consent).
192. 78 CONG. REC. 11,123 (1934).
193. Chairman Wheeler made the following explanation of S. 3645: "[This bill
proposes to give the Indians an opportunity to take over the control of their own
resources and fit them as American citizens." 78 CONG. REC. 11,124 (1934).
194. Id.
195. Id.
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In eliminating the objectionable features of the original
Wheeler-Howard Act, what Senator Wheeler'" and Congress
refused to do was to "segregate a small minority into groups,
styled 'chartered communities'" who "would have special ordi-
nances enacted for their benefit.., so as to place them under
different laws from the other citizens of [the] community."'"7
It was thought that the creation of such governments within
governments would "poison [the Indians] against their State
constitution" and "their local governments, of which they are a
part."'198
In summary, then, the BIA drafted a bill in the Solicitor's
Office of the Department of the Interior and sent it to Con-
gress in February, 1934. This bill would have gradually trans-
ferred to Indian tribes or communities all of the governmental
functions then exercised over them by the Secretary of the
Interior. In addition, this bill would have vested in the Indian
tribes broad, general governmental powers over nonmembers
lawfully residing within the boundaries of the chartered com-
196. A summary of Chairman Wheeler's views is as follows:
Title 1-Indian Se(f Government:
My thought about the bill is simply this: That you are going entirely too far at
the present time in letting these tribes set up these rules and regulations,
because they might conflict. As I said, when you take the Northwestern
Indian reservations, as I pointed out, you have Indians at the present time
holding county and State offices. Then, if you give them the power to set up
an entirely new government within their reservations and to pass ordinances
and regulate all Indian affairs, I think it would bring you into all kinds of
conflicts.... 1934 Senate Hearings, supra note 157, at 199-200.
Title Ill-Indian Lands:
... I agree with you with reference to the lands and the handling of the lands,
and I agree entirely with the revolving fund to allow these Indians to borrow
money to get started in cultivating that land up there. I think that could be
done rather than to have it doled out and controlled and leased to white
people. Id. at 169.
Title IV-Court of Indian affairs:
* . . As far as the court feature of the bill, the setting up of a new court, is
concerned, I am opposed to it absolutely, and I think it is unnecessary, and it
would entail an expense to the Government and deprive our present district
courts of that power and supersede the present Federal district courts and
their functions.... Id. at 146.
If you ever get this through Congress I will be surprised, because it is
perfectly ridiculous in my judgment. Id. at 208; see generally id. at 205-09.
Title l-Special Education for Indians:
This title was simply an extension of the Johnson-O'Malley Act passed earlier
in 1934. An uncontroversial provision, the substance of Title II sailed by
Congress almost without comment.
197. 78 CONG. REc. 9268 (statement of Congressman Hastings.)
198. Id.
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munities. Extensive hearings were held in both houses of Con-
gress to discuss the policy implications of the bill. After
thorough study and debate, Congress eliminated the objection-
able features. In July 1934, therefore, Congress refused to give
Indian tribes the expansive sovereign powers that many tribes
and tribal advocates now claim fall under the rubric of inher-
ent tribal sovereignty.
d. Executive Understanding of the Wheeler-Howard Act
In what might be termed "damage control," Felix Cohen
wrote an opinion under the auspices of the Solicitor's Office of
the Department of the Interior just months after the enact-
ment of the Wheeler-Howard Act, entitled Powers of Indian
Tribes.199 This opinion broadly construed the following phrase
contained in section 16 of the Act: "In addition to all powers
vested in any Indian tribe or tribal council by existing law, the
constitution adopted by said tribe shall also vest [enumerating
specific powers]."2 "0
Focusing on this language, Cohen reasons that had "the
intent of Congress been to limit the powers of an Indian tribe
to those previously granted by special legislation, it would nat-
urally have referred to 'existing laws' rather than 'existing
law' as the source of such powers."'" Cohen then argues that
the "term 'law' is a broader term than the term 'laws.' ,,02
Using this distinction as a guide to legislative intent,20 3 Cohen
199. See Powers of Indian Tribes, supra note 57.
200. Id. at 447. Those rights and powers "also vest[ed]" in tribes were enumerated
as follows: "To employ legal counsel, the choice of counsel and fixing of fees to be
subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior; to prevent the sale, disposition,
lease, or encumbrance of tribal lands, interests in lands, or other tribal assets without
the consent of the tribe; and to negotiate with the Federal, State, and local
Governments." S. 3645 § 16.
201. Powers of Indian Tribes, supra note 57, at 447.
202. Id.
203. Such reliance is clearly misplaced. First, note that the Solicitors Office of the
Department of the Interior drafted the original version of the Wheeler-Howard Act.
See 1934 Senate Hearings, supra note 149, at 237. Sensing the imminent defeat of the
whole scheme, Cohen also drafted the final version which supposedly eliminated the
controversial provision of the original bill. Id. Second, the "existing law" phase
received almost no attention during the long and contentious legislative debates. Id. at
244. Nonetheless, from a close study of both the legislative history and the powers of
Indian tribes opinion, one cannot help but admire the genius of Felix S. Cohen.
Although he has been widely regarded as a brilliant legal scholar, he was perhaps an
even greater political and legal tactician. Cohen's 1942 HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL 1NDIAN
LAW laid the groundwork for future tribal advocates to attain through the judicial
process what they were unable to attain in the legislative process.
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then lays down his now famous basic principle of Indian law,
the premise that "those powers which are lawfully vested in an
Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated powers granted by
express acts of Congress, but rather inherent power of a lim-
ited sovereignty which has never been extinguished.
204
From such sweeping premises, one would expect that
Cohen would proceed to enumerate broad powers over non-
Indians as part of the powers vested by existing law. But, sur-
prisingly, the discussion of inherent powers principally relates
to what the opinion calls "internal sovereignty", i.e., self-gov-
ernment or power over members.2 5 The opinion thus fits into
the existing case law but lays out a doctrinal means for future
expansion.
Interestingly, with respect to tribal jurisdiction, the opin-
ion draws a distinction between tribal lands and all lands
within the reservation. "Over tribal lands, the tribe has the
rights of a landowner as well as the rights of a local govern-
ment, dominion as well as sovereignty."2' But, absent some
relationship with it, 20 7 the tribe, apparently, lacks inherent
sovereignty over nonmembers occupying reservation lands
"under lawful authority," i.e., persons invited onto the reserva-
tion pursuant to the federal allotment policy and not there
merely at the sufferance of the tribe .2 ' Thus, although
Cohen's post-Wheeler-Howard Act opinion as to the scope of
"existing law" directly contradicts the legal memorandum
accompanying the original bill,2 9 Cohen was clearly aware that
"existing law" included the allotment acts.
204. Powers of Indian Tribes, supra note 57, at 447. His principle thus stated,
Cohen argues that one must look to judicial decisions and federal statutes "to
determine the limitations of tribal sovereignty rather than to determine its sources or
its positive content." Id. What is not expressly limited remains within the domain of
tribal sovereignty, and therefore properly falls within the statutory category, "powers
vested in any Indian tribe or tribal council by existing law." Id.
205. See Powers of Indian Tribes, supra note 57, at 445.
206. Id at 467.
207. The opinion states that, "[e]xcept where Congress has provided otherwise,
[the power to tax] may be exercised over... nonmembers, so far as such nonmembers
may accept privileges of trade, residence, etc., to with which taxes may be attached as
conditions." Id. at 465; see also Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982);
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
208. Powers of Indian Tribes, supra note 57, at 467; see also United States v.
Chavez, 290 U.S. 357, 364 (1933); Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204, 208 (1877).
209. "Indian self-government or home rule . . . is a matter of privilege
exclusively.... Fundamentally, under existing law, the Government's Indian Service
is a system of absolutism." Purpose and Operation of the Wheeler-Howard Indian
Rights Bill (S. 2755; H.R. 7902); 1934 House Hearings, supra note 155, at 18.
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This lack of inherent power to tax or otherwise regulate
the persons or property of non-Indians on non-Indian land was
made explicit in a subsequent opinion, issued just two months
after Powers of Indian Tribes. In this opinion, entitled
Wheeler-Howard Act-Interpretation,2 1  the Solicitor of the
Department of the Interior faced squarely the extent of the tri-
bal power of condemnation.
First, the source of this power was considered:
The power of eminent domain is one of the usual powers of
sovereignty. It is, as the United States Supreme Court held
in Cincinnati v. Louisville and Nash R.R. Co. (223 U.S. 390,
404), "one of the powers vital to the public welfare of every
self-governing community."
No Federal statutes terminating the exercise of this
power by an Indian tribe are known. Therefore, under the
doctrines advanced in the recent opinion of this Department
on "Powers of Indian Tribes" (M-27781, approved October
25, 1934), the power of eminent domain is one of those pow-
ers which are vested in an Indian tribe within the meaning
of Section 16 of the Wheeler-Howard Act."'
Yet, the opinion reached the following conclusion: "I am of the
opinion that the Indian Service is correct in assuming that a
tribe organized under section 16 may exercise the power of
eminent domain in the acquisition of land as against its mem-
bers, but not in the case of land owned in fee by
nonmembers.' "212
Thus, it was understood that inherent tribal sovereignty
extended only over tribal members. Moreover, it was under-
stood that such tribal power ceases to exist where an Indian
abandons his tribal membership. 213 "Threatened oppression in
210. 1 Op. Solic. Gen. 484 (1934) [hereinafter "Wheeler-Howard Act-
Interpretation"].
211. Id. at 489.
212. Id. (emphasis supplied). Cf. Duro v. Reina, 110 S.Ct. 2053 (1990).
213. Wheeler-Howard Act-Interpretation, supra note 210, at 490. Further, "as
was said in the opinion of this Department on [Powers of Indian Tribes, at 36], 'any
member of any Indian tribe is at full liberty to terminate his tribal relationship
whenever he so chooses.'" Id.
This view is consistent with the understanding of congressional sponsors of the
Wheeler-Howard Act as it was finally adopted. For example, during markup, the
enumerated power to "levy assessments on the members of the tribe for tribal
purposes" was stricken from section 16 of the final bill. Pertinent parts of that debate
are as follows:
Senator Thomas of Oklahoma. The theory of this bill, as I understand it, is an
enabling act for any tribe of Indians to form its own government.
[Vol. 14:211
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the form of condemnation, taxation, or other incidents of social
control may be avoided by the termination of the landowner's
tribal status. But if he remains to share in the benefits of tri-
bal life he must bear its burdens."" 4
As the opinion makes clear, termination of tribal status
places an Indian in the same position as a non-Indian.215 In
1934, therefore, it was a generally accepted principle that tribal
governmental power sprang from the source of consent. Thus,
whether the question involved condemnation, taxation, or any
other form of civil jurisdiction, it was thought that, absent
some sort of consensual relationship, tribes enjoyed no inher-
ent general powers over nonmembers. 6 Although this view
of tribal power seemingly contradicts Cohen's broad "basic
Chairman Wheeler. No.
Senator Thomas of Oklahoma. Just like we gave an enabling act to any
Territory to form its own government and come into the Nation.
Chairman Wheeler. Yes; but this provision is the very thing [the enabling
act]. Any group of people can get together now, call themselves the Ancient
Order of Pendos or anything else, and they can adopt a constitution and
bylaws.
Senator Frazier. They tax their members too.
Chairman Wheeler. Of course, but that is a voluntary proposition.... They
can charge a membership fee and make assessments.
Senator O'Mahoney. The point is that any member of any voluntary
organization could withdraw and could refuse to pay the assessment, but
under this, if Congress vests in the tribal council the right to levy or assess,
then the individual could not refuse to pay.
Chairman Wheeler. Exactly.... They haven't any right to do it.
Commissioner Collier. If that be stricken the rest will be taken care of.
Chairman Wheeler. Yes.
1934 Senate Hearings, supra note 157, at 249. Note that in Duro, the Court stated that
tribes are a good deal more than "private voluntary organizations." Duro, 110 S.Ct. at
2061 (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)). Yet, rejecting tribal
jurisdiction based on implied consent, the Court stated that express consent of the gov-
erned is needed. Id. at 2064. Thus, it appears that one may "quit" a tribe just as one
may quit a private club. But if one consents to tribal membership, then, unlike private
clubs, tribes enjoy all sorts of governmental power, such as criminal jurisdiction.
214. Wheeler-Howard Act-Interpretation, supra note 210, at 490. The opinion
continues: "The restricted land of the Indian who has severed his tribal affiliation is
not subject to tribal condemnation proceedings under tribal law." Id. Cf. Duro, 110
S.Ct. at 2064.
215.Accordingly, patented land may be condemned, as it may be taxed on
exactly the same basis as the lands of non-Indians. An Indian tribe will have
whatever rights of condemnation the laws of the State may give to it.... Land
held in fee, therefore, whether owned by Indians or by non-Indians, may be
condemned by an Indian tribe only in accordance with State law, through
proceedings brought in State courts.
1 Op. Solic. Gen. at 490-91.
216. Cf. Duro, 110 S.Ct. at 2064.
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principle," it is a statement of the law with which he appar-
ently would have concurred.
Fleshing out his earlier work, Powers of Indian Tribes, in
1942 Felix Cohen published his now famous Handbook of Fed-
eral Indian Law.217 In this latest work Cohen warned that we
must "beware of reading into the measure of this [Indian]
jurisdiction the common law principle of territoriality of crimi-
nal law.12 1 ' As Cohen recognized, the source and scope of
Indian powers derive from the "unextinguished fragments of
tribal sovereignty," and "it must be recognized that this sover-
eignty is primarily a personal rather than a territorial sover-
eignty. The tribal court has no jurisdiction over non-Indians
unless they consent to such jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction is
solely a jurisdiction over persons. "219
3. The Modern Ironies
In light of the long legislative history of the Wheeler-How-
ard Act, there are many ironies in the current state of Ameri-
can Indian jurisprudence. First, the original bill would have
established a federal court of Indian affairs with jurisdiction
over "all cases, civil and criminal, arising under the laws or
ordinances of a charter Indian community, wherein a real
party . .. is not a member of such community. '220 This court
would have been required to recognize and observe "all ...
rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States. 2 '
But Congress thought that this court unnecessarily duplicated
the function of state and federal courts,222 and stripped it from
the final version of the bill. The absence of such a court today,
however, means that nonmembers may, in certain circum-
stances, be hailed into a tribal court that is not necessarily
independent, and from which there is no constitutional right of
217. See 1942 COHEN HANDBOOK supra note 29; see also RAmCK, supra note 67,
(comparing 1982 edition with Cohen's 1942 edition).
218. 1942 COHEN HANDBOOK, supra note 29, at 360.
219. Id. (emphasis supplied).
220. H.R. 7902 and S. 2755, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. Title IV, § 3(3).
221. Id., § 10.
222. The following statement of Chairman Wheeler is illustrative: "As far as the
court feature of the bill, the setting up of a new, is concerned, I am opposed to
absolutely, and I think it is unnecessary, and it would entail an expense to the
Government and deprive our present district court of that power and supersede the
present Federal district courts and their functions. I do not think it is necessary at all
. . . " 1934 Senate Hearings, supra note 157, at 146.
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appeal.2 ' Clearly, the Congress that enacted the final
Wheeler-Howard Act would have abhorred this unintended
result.
Second, the original bill would have provided for the
organization of Indian tribes as "Federal municipal corpora-
tions" '224 which would have allowed them to set up laws that
might conflict with laws of the states.22 5  Because Congress
thought that this provision would be a step backward instead
of a step forward,226 it also eliminated this provision from the
final version of the bill.227  Today, however, a major conflict
between tribes and states concerns the problem of "exemption
marketing." For example, a state may have environmental
regulations more restrictive than federal law.2 8 But in an
223. See Bolton Letter, supra note 9.
224. H.R. 7902 and S. 2755, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., Title 1, § 4(a).
225. The following exchange illustrates this fact:
Chairman Wheeler. The thing that puzzles me is just how far they can go
under this bill in setting up ordinances and laws which might conflict with the
laws of the State. Can you answer that, Mr. Commissioner?
Commissioner Collier. They could go, theoretically, just as far as they can go
without conflicting with existing Federal law, which is pretty far, Senator.
1934 Senate Hearings, supra note 157, at 177.
226. See id. at 199 (Chairman Wheeler).
227. Another exchange is illustrative:
Chairman Wheeler. If you say to the .. . Indians, "Under this law you can
make rules and regulations for the control of your own property, and control
your property, hold your property in common if you want to, under this law,
but we are not going to extend you the right to set up laws which might
conflict with the laws in the State[s] ... in which you are living at the present
time.
Commissioner Collier. I think you have pointed toward a necessary
amendment. Where they exist as municipalities they could be allowed to set
up ordinances like any other municipality, provided that they do not conflict
with the laws of the State.
Chairman Wheeler. Yes.
Id. at 179.
228. See, e.g., Washington Dep't of Ecology v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency, 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985). In that case, the court affirmed an
EPA decision to exclude Indian lands from an approved state hazardous waste
program. Because the applicable federal statute did not define the term "Indian
lands," the court accepted the EPA interpretation that the definition of Indian country
for criminal jurisdiction purposes controlled. Id. at 1467 n.1. As argued elsewhere in
this Article, however, reliance on 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (which defines Indian country for
the purpose of criminal jurisdiction) is misplaced. Further, the court did not decide
the question of whether a state is empowered to create an environmental program
reaching into the exterior boundaries of reservations when that program is limited to
non-Indians. Id. at 1468. The Court's reasoning in Brendale, however, suggests that
this extension would be allowable. See also Allen, Who Should Control Hazardous
Waste on Native American Lands? Looking Beyond Department of Ecology v. EPA, 14
EcowGY L. Q. 69 (1987).
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effort to attract industries to their reservations, Indian tribes
might enact less restrictive regulations than those of the state,
thereby effectively destroying the ability of the state to imple-
ment and comprehensively enforce its environmental policies.
Again, this state of affairs seems to be exactly the sort of con-
flict which Congress wished to prevent.
Third, although the original bill received almost unprece-
dented study and debate,22 the phrase that has turned out to
be the most important sailed through markup without a single
comment concerning its substantive effect.230 This phrase is, of
course, the one concerning "existing law" in section 16 of the
final Act.231 Ignoring the Act's long and contentious legislative
history, one leading modern commentator argues that the Act
"specified certain tribal powers but largely relied on the
existing, retained sovereignty of the tribes. '2 32  The legislative
history outlined above clearly precludes such an assertion.233
229. One of the sponsors of the bill, Representative Howard, stated to Congress
that "[i]t is doubtful if any piece of legislation in the history of the country has been
more thoroughly intelligently studied and debated." 78 CONG. REc. 11,731 (1934).
Indeed, in the House of Representatives alone, the Committee on Indian Affairs held
29 different sessions on the bill. See id. at 11,726.
230. 1934 Senate Hearings, supra note 157, at 244.
231. See supra notes 200-209 and accompanying text.
232. Collins, Implied Limitations, supra note 64, at 510. One might also wonder
why some commentators place such great emphasis on an April 28, 1934 letter written
by President Roosevelt to Senator Wheeler and Representative Howard. Indeed, as
Representative Carter did, one might query why this letter was even included in the
House and Senate Reports:
Mr. Carter. I notice in the [May 28, 1934] report a letter from President
Roosevelt to the Chairman of the Indian Affairs Committee in which he
endorses the basic and broad principles set forth in the so-called "Wheeler-
Howard" bill. I am wondering why this letter was published in the report, as
the bill reported out by the committee is an entirely different bill than the
[revised] Wheeler-Howard bill, and this letter was based on the [original]
Wheeler-Howard bill. 78 CONG. REc. 11,738 (June 15, 1934); cf. H.R. REP. No.
1084, 73d Cong., 2d Sess, 8 (1934); S. REP. No. 1154, 73d Cong., 2d Sess, 3-4
(1934).
233. In the text and footnotes appear numerous quotes reflecting the viewpoints
and concerns of those charged with the legislative and administrative responsibility
over Indian affairs. Supra notes 155-198 and accompanying text. Although it was the
Senate version which was ultimately enacted, the following House floor colloquy,
which, occurring just three days before the final bill was adopted, suggests that the
"intent" of the members of the House should be controlling-
Mr. Christianson. Is it not a fact that the House bill as it appears before us,
was written by those who objected most strenuously to the original Wheeler-
Howard bill?
Mr. Howard. That is absolutely true.
Mr. Christianson. And it represents the viewpoint of the critics of the
legislation against which the attacks have been leveled?
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Indeed, it defies common sense to suppose that Congress
would, with one hand, expressly deny Indians broad govern-
mental powers (especially over non-Indians) while, with the
other, implicitly confirm those very same powers.
Fourth, one of the most interesting ironies concerning the
Act's legislative history is that although the author of the bill,
Felix Cohen, was present at all of the legislative sessions,234 he
made himself almost invisible. The markup eliminating (from
what ultimately became section 16 of the final version of the
act) the conferral of the power to levy assessments is
instructive:
Chairman Wheeler. Who is your legal advisor that drew up
that phase of it? Did any lawyer draw it up? If he did, I
would like to hear from the legal advisor on that point.
Commissioner Collier. He is not here.
Chairman Wheeler. I have never been able to find out who
in the name of goodness drew up any of this bill.
Commissioner Collier. A good lawyer did it.21s
The ultimate irony of the legislative history of the
Wheeler-Howard Act is that today there would be significantly
less conflict between Indian tribes and state and local govern-
ments, and non-Indians would be in a significantly better legal
position, had the original bill been enacted. The consolidation
mechanism would have eliminated the checkerboard land-
holding patterns that give rise to conflicts, for-as Commis-
sioner Collier had assured the Congress-the boundaries of the
Indian communities would not have extended to areas highly
populated by non-Indians.236 Moreover, as federal municipal
corporations, the tribes would necessarily have to observe and
Mr. Howard. That is right.
Mr. Christianson. And when the bill, in its final form, was submitted to the
committee, there was not a single dissenting vote.
Mr. Howard. That is right.
78 CONG. REC. 11,732 (1934).
234. Felix S. Cohen's name appears in the record of attendance preceding all of
the hearings.
235. 1934 Senate Hearings, supra note 157, at 248. As history has shown, however,
the "good lawyer" did not remain invisible for long. Within just a few months after
the adoption of the final version of the act, Felix S. Cohen would, under the auspices
of the Department of the Interior, issue his opinion on the meaning of the "existing
laws" phrase contained in section 16. The "Powers of Indian Tribes" opinion, of
course, was later fleshed out into the most influential of all Indian law treatises, F.
Cohen's 1942 HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW. See supra notes 58-67 and
accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 175-190 and accompanying text.
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respect the United States Constitution. 37 And non-Indians
would enjoy the right to appeal local Indian court decisions to
a federal court of Indian affairs.23 In the face of these ironies,
perhaps the Congress should consider enacting new legislation
modeled after Cohen's original bill. In any event, those ironies
call for a fundamental rethinking of Indian law.
IV. RETHINKING INDIAN LAW
A. In General
There are many ways to approach the field of Indian law.
One may seek to divine the content of a Platonic notion of
Indian sovereignty through an exegesis of the Supreme Court's
opinions;239 or one may attempt to discern the intent of Con-
gress, as manifested in relevant treaties and statutes.24° The
Supreme Court has correctly been moving away from the for-
mer approach and toward the latter.2 4 Indeed, one of the
Court's two remaining proponents of a broad vision of inherent
tribal sovereignty recently called for the court to direct its
attention to the 1934 Congress that "established the Indian pol-
icies to which we are heir."242
As section III of this Article illustrated, the 1934 Congress
attempted to reconcile its two earlier inconsistent promises. In
the Indian treaties, the federal government promised Indian
tribes reservations for their exclusive use and benefit. This
promise is their charter for self-government. In the allotment
acts of the late 1800s, the federal government both broke its
promise to the Indians and made new promises to non-Indians
by inviting them onto the reservations pursuant to a federal
policy of assimilation. To be sure, the Wheeler-Howard Act of
1934 halted the further allotment of reservation lands. With
respect to those lands still held by Indians, the Wheeler-How-
ard Act restored the federal government's earlier treaty prom-
237. See supra note 170.
238. See supra notes 169-174 and accompanying text.
239. But see McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973)
(rejecting such an approach).
240. See Martone, Congressional License?, supra note 22, at 635 (arguing that this
is the proper methodology).
241. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Nation, 109 S.Ct.
2994 (1989); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987); Rice v.
Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981);
Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. County of Yakima, 903
F.2d 1207 (9th Cir. 1990).
242. Brendale, 109 S.Ct. at 3025 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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ise. Except to the extent that Indian tribes were given a new
lease on their existence, however, the Wheeler-Howard Act did
not repudiate the allotment promise made to non-Indians.
That is, the clock was not turned back to pre-allotment time.
The Wheeler-Howard Act reconciliation leads to the two legal
propositions posed in the introduction of this Article. Before
turning to these propositions, however, two other questions
must be considered: first, the extent to which court precedent
relating to the tenth amendment affects our rethinking of
Indian law; second, whether state action principles should be
invoked in the area of Indian law.
B. The Tenth Amendment Analogy in Light of
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Authority243
The tenth amendment 244 does not expressly mention
Indian tribes. Nonetheless, some commentators have argued
that "Indian treaty negotiations are parallel in concept to nego-
tiations with representatives of states over statehood,' '245 and
in an analogous manner reserve to the tribes those powers not
expressly or impliedly relinquished to the United States.24" Of
243. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
244. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
245. C. WIUKNSON, AMERICAN INDIANs, supra note 27, at 102.
246. It has also been argued that Indian treaties are "essentially contracts between
two sovereign nations." Id. (citing Washington v. Washington State Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 675 (1979)); but see Martone,
Congressional License?, supra note 22, 606-07 (refuting the proposition by examining
treaty language limiting tribal authority by the United States Constitution and federal
law and arguing that the 1871 act abolishes the making of any further Indian treaties
and establishes a congressional intent to "extinguish tribal sovereignty vis-a-vis the
United States"). Also of interest is the following correspondence from Andrew
Jackson to President Monroe:
I have long viewed treaties with the Indians an absurdity not to be reconciled
to the principles of our government. The Indians are the subjects of the
United States, inhabiting its territory and acknowledging its sovereignty, then
it is not absurd for the sovereign to negotiate by treaty with the subject?
(quoted in Higgins, International Law Consideration of the American Indian Nations
By the United States, 3 Auz. L. REV. 74, 82 (1961)). Some commentators have argued
that "Indian treaty negotiations are parallel in concept to negotiations with representa-:
tives of prospective states over statehood," and/or that the "Indian treaties are "essen-
tially contract[s] between two sovereign nations." Id. (citing Washington v. Washington
State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 675 (1979)). If
accepted, however, the proposition may be a two-edged sword; tribal powers might lose
their extra-constitutional status. In a 1988 decision, the Court declared that the protec-
tions of the Bill of Rights could not be abrogated within the continental United States,
for "it is well established that 'no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on
the Congress or on any other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints
of the Constititution."' Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988) (citing Reid v. Covert,
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course, because they are facially reserved in the Constitution,
state powers are more permanent than tribal powers.247 In any
event, current Supreme Court thinking undermines tribal
attempts to gain any strength from the analogy.
After suffocating it for nearly 40 years, the Supreme Court
breathed new life into the tenth amendment in 1976, stating
that "Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that
impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effec-
tively in the federal system."2 4 Five years later, the Court
elaborated a more specific test: The tenth amendment is vio-
lated only by federal laws that would "directly impair [the
states'] ability 'to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional functions.' ,249
In that same year, the Court established a similar test with
respect to reserved tribal powers. In Montana v. United
States,250 a case involving tribal regulation of nonmember
hunting and fishing on the reservation, the Court announced
the "general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of
an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers
of the tribe."2 5 ' The Court then stated two exceptions to that
general proposition,252 the second of which parallels the tenth
amendment reasoning employed in National League of Cities
and Hodel. A tribe may retain inherent power to exercise civil
354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957)); accord Duro v. Reina, 110 S.Ct. 2053, 2064 (1990). See also DeGe-
ofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1889) (The treaty power does not "extend so far as to
authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the govern-
ment or in that of one of the States, or a cession of any portion of the territory of the
latter, without its consent." (citing Ft. Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 541
(1885)). All American Indians were granted United States citizenship in 1924. 8 U.S.C.
§ 140 1(a)(2)(1970) (originally enacted as Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253). In
theory, the rule of Boos v. Barry would threaten extra-constitutional assertions of tri-
bal jurisdiction over even its own members, not to mention nonmembers with no voice
in the tribal political process. Cf. Duro, 110 S.Ct. 2053.
247. C. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 27, at 102.
248. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
249. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Recl. Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1961)
(quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852).
250. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
251. Id. at 565.
252. The first exception is the so-called "consensual relations" test: "A tribe may
regulate, through taxation, through licensing, or other means, the activities of
nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members,
through a commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements." Id. The
court did not elaborate this test, and, apparently, has not invoked it since Montana.
The cases cited, however, indicate the exception relates to direct commercial dealings
between a non-Indian and a tribe. See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S.
130 (1982) (non-Indian mining of tribally owned minerals on trust lands).
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authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within
its reservation when that conduct "threatens or has some
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or
the health and welfare of the tribe. ' ' 2" 3
In its 1985 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Author-
ity 254 decision, however, the Court once again stifled the tenth
amendment by overruling National League of Cities. The
rationale for the overruling was that it was difficult, if not
impossible, to identify an organizing principle from National
League of Cities and its progeny.2
The second exception of Montana suffers from the same
problem. The Montana second exception is unworkable
mainly because the Court did not articulate the basis from
which it is derived. The Court left unclear whether the excep-
tion derived from some preconstitutional basis recognized in
the treaty or from some statutory delegation. Without know-
ing the answer to this question, it is difficult, if not impossible,
to articulate the scope of the exception. Thus, in Brendale,2"
both the White opinion and the Blackmun dissent purport to
apply the second exception, but reach starkly contrasting
conclusions. 57
In Garcia, the Court also noted that state sovereign inter-
ests are protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the
structure of the federal system.' Unlike states, however,
tribes do not have two senators or direct control over electoral
qualifications for federal elections. Nonetheless, tribal mem-
bers are not powerless in the federal system; they can vote and
participate as candidates in all federal, state, and local elec-
tions. Moreover, "Indians have learned how to lobby. Highly
effective legislative campaigns have been pursued by individual
tribes and by national organizations. Indians and their advo-
cates hold a range of well-placed staff positions in Congress." '259
This is evidenced by the fact that "[n]o Indian legislation has
been passed over Indian opposition since the Indian Civil
253. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66.
254. 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1984).
255. Id. at 540-46.
256. See discussion of Brendale, infra, notes 275-321 and accompanying text.
257. See infra notes 280-299 and accompanying text. The practical lesson is that
the Montana second exception essentially calls for a political, not a legal,
determination. Should an unelected judiciary become involved in such business?
258. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552.
259. C. WILImNSON, AMEIcAN INDIANS, supra note 27, at 82.
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Rights Act of 1968. ' 260
In short, current tenth amendment jurisprudence strongly
suggests that the second exception of Montana is indeed troub-
lesome and should be reevaluated.
C. The State Action Theory
Although Indian tribes may not be subject to the United
States Constitution, the federal government is. Moreover, a
tribe can only be recognized through some action on the part
of the federal government,261 be it through a treaty,26 2 an exec-
utive order,263 a unilateral statute, 6 or recognition by the Sec-
retary of the Interior pursuant to statutorily delegated
authority.265 Indian tribes have no rights or powers recogniza-
ble and enforceable in federal courts unless and until Congress
expresses its will as to what they are.2' Inherent tribal sover-
eignty and federal plenary power over Indian affairs is a con-
tradiction of terms. Tribes can do very little without federal
governmental approval.267  Therefore, because tribal power
involves state action, a tribe's exercise of that power should be
260. Id. at 83.
261. For a typical application of the state action doctrine see Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
262. The applicability of the Constitution to the congressional exercise of its
treaty-making power with the Indians and the constitutional difficulties in a broad
grant of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians was recognized by the Attorney General of
the United States over 150 years ago. See 2 Op. Atty. Gen. 693, 694 (1834).
263. C. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, suPra note 27, at 8.
264. Id.
265. Id.; see also 25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (to qualify for federal benefits and services, a
tribe seeking federal recognition must satisfy seven criteria).
266. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955) (federal government
not liable for taking when it, pursuant to a congressional authorization, granted right
to harvest timber on land held under aboriginal title); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S.
543 (1823) (alienation of Indian title permissable only with federal approval).
267. For example, a tribe cannot lease its land without approval from the
Secretary of Interior. 69 Stat. 539, ch. 615 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 396,
415-415d) (nonagricultural surface leasing); Comptroller Generals Report to the Senate
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Management of Indian
Natural Resources, pt. 2 (Comm. Print 1976). But there can be no doubt that, under
existing law, tribes may not validly exercise any sovereign powers, over members or
nonmembers, unless and until there is some state action, i.e., federal recognition.
Compare the difference between federal recognition of Indian tribes with federal
recognition of Cuba or North Korea or, for that matter, Red China in the 1970s. The
existence of governmental power in these countries is certainly not dependent on
United States recognition. But the existence of governmental power by an Indian tribe
is completely dependent on such recognition. See also discussion of full sovereignty
view of some commentators, supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
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governed by equal protection and due process guarantees;2 8
under current law, it is not.
In a nation founded upon principles of representative
democracy, it is unclear why the Supreme Court would con-
sider countenancing tribal assertions of governmental power
over nonmembers who are denied fundamental rights of repre-
sentation that are guaranteed by the Constitution." 9 For
example, nonmembers are denied the right to vote in tribal
elections, the right to participate as candidates for tribal office,
and the right to organize and meaningfully participate in the
tribal political process. Outside the domain of Indian affairs,
the denial of such fundamental rights is subject to strict judi-
cial scrutiny and struck down as an unconstitutional violation
of the equal protection clause.27 ° Why should many nonmem-
ber reservation residents who own land on reservations pursu-
ant to congressional invitation be denied voice in or
accountability from local governments that seek to assert judi-
cial and legislative powers over them?
To be sure, congressionally created preferences for Indians
have been upheld in the face of equal protection challenges. In
Morton v. Mancari,21 the Supreme Court upheld a provision
in the Wheeler-Howard Act granting an employment prefer-
ence to Indians for positions in the Bureau of Indian Affairs.1
2
"The Court, reconciling Indian law and equal protection princi-
ples, adopted a rational basis test." The statute was upheld
because it was "tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress's
unique obligation toward the Indians."" s
There is a distinction, however, between granting prefer-
ences and denying constitutional rights. In this context, the
preferences are granted from a higher sovereign- the United
States government. Moreover, the preferences stem from a
unique obligation rooted in notions of pre-constitutional and
extra-constitutional sovereignty. The denial of constitutional
rights, however, comes not from a higher sovereign, but rather
268. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
269. Cf. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
270. See supra notes 4, 5, and 6. Cf. Duro v. Reina, 110 S.Ct. 2053 (1990).
271. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
272. 417 U.S. at 547-48.
273. C. WLKINSON, AMERIcAN INDLANS, supra note 27, at 79. The Court has also
applied a rational basis test in at least one other Indian law case. E.g., Delaware Tribal
Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84-85 (1977) settlement (act benefitting
Oklahoma Delawares and excluding Kansas Delawares upheld because tied rationally
to Congress' trust responsibility to Indian tribes).
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from a sovereign that has no direct accountability to nonmem-
bers. Because this result contradicts established state action
precedents,274 a different analysis should be applied. Tribal
assertions of governmental authority over nonmembers fall
within the rubric of external relations. Because only internal
relations of the tribe are preconstitutional (and extra-constitu-
tional), external relations should be subject to the Constitu-
tion. Thus, the due process and equal protection clauses
should govern tribal attempts to assert governmental power
over nonmembers.
This approach offers several advantages. First, it recog-
nizes the inherent state action principles involved in modern
Indian affairs. Second, it is consistent with traditional constitu-
tional analysis. Third, it allows for a balancing of tribal, fed-
eral, and state interests. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, it provides lower courts with a method of analysis
with which they are familiar and eliminates much of the con-
fusion and uncertainty surrounding litigation of Indian law
issues. As illustrated in the next section of this Article, the
Court is already moving in this direction.
D. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the
Yakima Nation
275
In its 1989 term, the Brendale case presented the Court
with an opportunity to define precisely the scope of tribal civil
authority. Brendale presented the question of whether the
Yakima Indian tribe, on the one hand, or the County of
Yakima, on the other, possesses the exclusive authority to con-
trol, through comprehensive zoning, the use of land owned by
nonmembers but located within the exterior boundaries of the
Yakima reservation.
The Court consolidated two cases: one involving the "open
area" of the reservation;276 the other involving the "closed
area" of the reservation.21 7 Although a decision by the BIA
274. Cf. supra notes 9 and 261.
275. 109 S.Ct. 2994 (1989).
276. The "open area" is so called because anyone can travel freely within it. Id. at
3000. It consists of 350,000 acres located within Yakima County. The primary activity
in the open area is agriculture. Tribal members farm only about 12,300 of the 143,000
irrigated acres. Moreover, 80 percent of the 25,000 open area residents were
nonmembers of the tribe. Id.
277. The "closed area" is so called because of the 1954 decision of the Tribe to
restrict access to only tribal members and permittees. Id. at 3000. The BIA, however,
invalidated this decision just months prior to the oral argument before the Supreme
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had obliterated the legal distinction between the open and
closed areas by the time of oral argument, for convenience's
sake the Court continued to refer to them as such, and the two
"swing" justices21s followed the district court in treating them
differently. This distinction is based upon the factual findings
of the district court concerning the respective threats posed by
a holding of exclusive county authority to the tribe's "political
integrity, economic security, health and welfare. '279 Three
separate views of tribal governmental power, two of them
bright line and the third quite fuzzy, emerged from the three
opinions.
1. Justice White's View: No Inherent or Reserved Power
Over Nonmembers
First, Justice White, writing for himself and three other
justices, opined that the tribe enjoys no treaty-reserved or
inherent powers to regulate land held in fee by nonmembers.
Congress abrogated the treaty promise of "exclusive use and
benefit" when it opened the reservation pursuant to the fed-
eral allotment policy. 8 Thus, the tribe had been divested of
its treaty power to exclude, and its lesser power to regulate,
fee owners within the boundaries of the reservation. 28l Justice
White also states that the tribes' inherent or preconstitutional
powers are limited to internal affairs. To the extent that these
powers are inconsistent with their dependent status, tribes no
longer retain any inherent power over external relations, 2
which include the "regulation of the relations between an
Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe.1283 Moreover, the
opinion expressly provides that a tribe's inherent sovereignty
is not the equivalent of a local government's police power.
Thus, "[t]he governing principle is that the tribe has no author-
ity itself, by way of tribal ordinance or actions in the tribal
Court. No one resided there. It consists of 807,000 acres, only 740,000 of which were
located in Yakima County. The primary activity in the "closed area" was forestry.
Only about 25,000 of the 740,000 acres located in Yakima County were owned in fee
simple. Moreover, the county maintained no roads nor provided any essential services
in the area. Id.
278. Justices Stevens and O'Connor.
279. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981).
280. Brendale, 109 S.Ct. at 3003-3004.
281. Id. at 3004.
282. Id. at 3005.
283. Id.
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courts, to regulate the use of [nonmembers'] fee lands." 2s4
Justice White's opinion, however, does not suggest that
tribes are left with no recourse to protect themselves. Indeed,
the Supremacy Clause requires state and local governments to
recognize and respect tribal interests in the course of their
activities. Through a nuisance-type theory grounded in treaties
or federal statutes, tribes can enjoin activities occurring on fee
lands that have "demonstrably serious impacts that imperil
their political integrity, economic security, or health and
welfare."2 5
2. Justice Blackmun's View: Full Inherent Sovereignty Over
Nonmembers
The dissent (Justice Blackmun, writing for himself and
two other justices) also supports the establishment of a bright-
line rule, but one cutting the other way.8 Justice Blackmun
maintains that the Montana decision was an anomaly: a long
line of Indian law decisions establish a governing principle at
odds with the principle articulated by Justice White-"a princi-
ple according to which tribes retain their inherent sovereign
powers over non-Indians on reservation lands unless the exer-
cise of that sovereignty would be inconsistent with the overrid-
ing interests of the National Government. ' 28 7  Justice
Blackmun refers to Cohen's Powers of Indian Tribes as "the
definitive administrative interpretation of inherent Indian sov-
ereignty"2' and cites the following passage therefrom: "[b]ut
over all the lands of the reservation, whether owned by the
tribe, by members thereof, or by outsiders, the tribe has the
sovereign power of determining the conditions upon which per-
sons shall be permitted to enter its domain, to reside thereon,
and to do business." 2 9 The dissent fails, however, to quote
Cohen's immediate qualification of that passage: "provided
284. Id. at 3008.
285. Id.
286. In a footnote, however, Justice Blackmun qualifies his opinion and thus blurs
the brightness of the line he would draw: "liit may be that on some reservations,
including the Yakima reservation, there are essentially self-contained, definable, areas
in which non-Indian fee lands so predominate that the tribe has no significant interest
in controlling land use." Id. at 3027 n.9.
287. Id. at 3018 (quoting Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 153 (1980)).
288. Id. at 3020 n.4.
289. Id. (quoting Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 14, 1 Op. Solic. Gen. 445
(1934)).
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only such determination is consistent with applicable Federal
laws and does not infringe any vested rights of persons now
occupying reservation lands under lawful authority."2"
Ironically, Justice Blackmun then commits the basic error
that Cohen himself warned against, stating that "tribal sover-
eignty is in large part geographically determined." '' Justice
Blackmun also relies upon Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe,"2 a decision upholding a tribe's authority to impose a
severance tax on non-Indian oil and gas producers who had
entered into long-term lease contracts with a tribe concerning
tribal trust lands-an issue clearly distinguishable from the
open-area facts involving no contract and only reservation
lands held in fee simple by non-Indian owners.293 Justice
Blackmun's reliance on Merrion is evidence that the compet-
ing theories of tribal governmental power discussed earlier 4
are of more than mere academic concern. Indeed, these con-
flicting theories form the basis for the diverging opinions and
results.
Justice Blacknun is most persuasive when he states that
"the general inability of a tribe to control land use on numer-
ous tracts of land interspersed across its reservation ... inher-
ently threaten[s] the political integrity, economic security, or
health or welfare of the tribe.' '29 5 In essence, this was the
rationale of the Ninth Circuit opinion when it reversed the dis-
trict court's holding that the county possessed exclusive juris-
diction in the open area.2 9 But this rationale is based
290. Powers of Indian Tribes, 1 Op. Solic. Gen., at 467 (emphasis supplied),
discussed supra notes 119-209 and accompanying text. At the time the opinion was
issued, applicable federal laws included section 6 of the general Allotment Act of 1887
(allotees of fee land "shall have the benefit of and be subject to the laws, both civil and
criminal, of the State or Territory in which they may reside"); Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S.
204, 208 (1877) (land ceases to be Indian country whenever tribes lose title); United
States v. Chavez, 290 U.S. 357, 364 (1933). Of course, for purposes of federal criminal
jurisdiction, the definition of Indian country is much broader. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151.
291. But see supra note 219 and accompanying text (tribal sovereignty is primarily
a personal rather than a territorial sovereignty); Duro v. Reina, 110 S.Ct. 2053, 2060
(1990) (Justice Blackmun joined majority opinion relying on theory of personal
sovereignty).
292. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
293. Because it involved a contract entered into with the tribe, the Merrion
decision more properly belongs within the realm of the first exception of Montana, the
so-called "consensual relations" exception.
294. See supra notes 41-103 and accompanying text.
295. Brendale, 109 S.Ct. at 3024 (Justice Blackmun, J., dissenting).
296. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 828
F.2d 529, 534-35 (9th Cir. 1987) (denying the tribe the right to zone non-Indian fee land
1991] 269
270 University of Puget Sound Law Review
essentially on the concept of efficiency in local land use con-
trol. What constitutes efficient land use control, however, is
essentially a policy question. In the face of possible impair-
ment of constitutional rights and congressional intent to the
contrary, a government interest in enjoying the most efficient
form of land use control seems less than compelling.
Given the full sovereignty result advocated by Justice
Blackmun, it is interesting that he would suggest that the
"Indian policies to which we are heir" can be discerned by
directing one's attention to the intent of the Congress that
enacted the Wheeler-Howard Act.' Clearly, Justice Black-
mun perceives the Wheeler-Howard Act as a full repudiation
of the second promise (the allotment acts) and a full restora-
tion of the first promise." s But, as discussed earlier in this
Article, the Wheeler-Howard Act only partially repudiated the
second promise and only partially restored the first; no further
lands would be allotted or sold, and, as to those lands already
held in fee by nonmembers, the tribes simply no longer pos-
sessed the power to exclude. That is, the allotment acts are
still good law." Justice Stevens recognizes as much, but adds
an interesting twist.
3. Justice Stevens's View: Guess Now, Litigate Later
The key votes in Brendale were provided in the opinion by
Justices Stevens and O'Connor. In Justice Stevens's words,
"the proper resolution of these cases depends on the extent to
which the tribe's virtually absolute power to exclude has been
either diminished by federal statute or voluntarily surrendered
by the Tribe itself."'  Justice Stevens first notes that:
the power to zone closely parallels the common law of nui-
sance and finds guidance in the maxim . .. use your own
"would effectively destroy their capacity to engage in comprehensive planning, so
fundamental to a zoning scheme.") In contrast, the district court had found that there
was no evidence that checkerboard land use authority would be a per se threat to the
tribe's political integrity, economic security or health and welfare.
297. BrendaLe, 109 S.Ct. at 3025 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). If Blackmun himself
were to study the legislative history of the Wheeler-Howard Act of 1934, he might be
forced to reach a result contrary to the one he preferred in Brendale.
298. Md at 3025 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
299. Id. at 3011 (the allotment acts reworked fundamental notions of Indian
sovereignty); see also Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v.
County of Yakima, 903 F.2d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 1990).
300. Brendale, 109 S.Ct. at 3009. Query: is the concept of voluntary surrender
parallel to that of a nonuser?
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property in such a manner as not to injure that of another
... . As in nuisance law, the issue is ultimately one of
whether the proposed land use is like a pig in the parlor
instead of the barnyard.3s 1
The Yakima Tribe's preconstitutional power to exclude
was expressly confirmed in the treaty promise to the tribe of
"exclusive use and benefit" of reservation lands.s° 2 Justice Ste-
vens argues that the allotment acts did not expressly transfer
regulatory power from the tribe to any state or local govern-
mental authority; "[n]onetheless," the acts "in some respects
diminished tribal authority. 's0 3 To resolve the conflict, Justice
Stevens then attempts to discern the intent of Congress:
Although it is inconceivable that Congress would have
intended that the sale of a few lots would divest the Tribe of
the power to determine the character of the tribal commu-
nity, it is equally improbable that Congress envisioned that
the Tribe would retain its interest in regulating the use of
vast ranges of land sold in fee to nonmembers who lack any
voice in setting tribal policy.
304
Guided by this theory of congressional intent, Justice Ste-
vens decides that the closed area should be treated differently
from the open area. While he eschews the importance of such
labels, Justice Stevens states that "[w]hat is important is that
[in the closed area] the Tribe has maintained a defined area in
which only a very small percentage of the land is held in fee,"
while in the open area "approximately half of the land is held
in fee." 5 "[lit is unlikely that Congress intended to give the
Tribe the power to determine the character of [the open area,
which] is predominantly owned and populated by nonmembers,
who represent 80 percent of the population yet lack a voice in
tribal governance.""
301. Id.
302. Treaty with the Yakima Indian Nation, 12 Stat. 951, art. 11 (1859).
303. Brendale, 109 S.Ct. at 3011. "A statute that authorizes the sale of a parcel of
land in a reservation must implicitly grant the purchaser access to that property. In
addition, to the extent that large portions of reservation land were sold in fee, such
that the Tribe could no longer determine the essential character of the region by
setting conditions on entry to those parcels, the Tribe's legitimate interest in land use
regulation [is] also diminished." Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 3012 n.2.
306. Id. at 3016. A doctoral dissertation tested the following hypothesis: in Indian
jurisdiction cases before the Supreme Court, if non-Indians constitute a majority of the
persons who will be affected, the Court will rule against the tribe (and vice versa).
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Justice Stevens also acknowledges the equal protection
problems inherent in a finding of exclusive tribal jurisdiction
rather than exclusive county jurisdiction:
Indians and non-Indians alike are eligible to vote in County
elections. Only enrolled members of the Tribe, however, are
entitled to participate in Tribal elections. Similarly, while
the county provides police protection, public education, and
other social services to both Indians and non-Indians [cita-
tions omitted], government services provided by the Tribe-
although theoretically available to all residents-are in prac-
tice generally used only by members of the Tribe.s°7
In Justice Stevens's view, "the Tribe's power to zone is
like an equitable servitude; the burden of complying with the
Tribe's zoning rules runs with the land without regard to how
a particular estate was transferred."" 8 Arguing that "equitable
servitudes fall within the same family as easements," Justice
Stevens concludes that if fee owners enjoy the benefits of an
implied easement, °" they also must accept the burdens of an
implied servitude. The resolution of the case, therefore, must
be determined by a factual inquiry into the degree of control
that the tribe maintains to define the essential character of the
region. Invoking the change-of-neighborhood doctrine,310 Jus-
tice Stevens says that "the open area has lost its character as
an exclusive tribal resource, and has become, as a practical
matter, an integrated portion of the county, and has also lost
any claim to an interest analogous to an equitable servi-
tude.' ' 311 Therefore, Justice Stevens concludes that in the open
area the county possessed exclusive jurisdiction.312
In the closed area, however, he concludes that the tribe
The hypothesis proved correct in about 85 percent of the cases studied. See Fetzer,
Politics, Law and Indian Treaties (dissertation presented to Political Science Dept. of
the Univ. of Oregon, 1981).
307. Brendale, 109 S.Ct. at 3016.
308. Id. at 3014.
309. When the tribe had earlier denied him access to his property, Mr. Brendale
sued and won under an implied easement theory. See Brendale v. Olney, No. C-78-145
(E.D. Wash., March 3, 1981).
310. That is, "an equitable servitude lapses when the restriction, as applied to 'the
general vicinity and not merely a few parcels,' has 'become outmoded,' has 'lost its
usefulness,' or has become 'inequitable to enforce.'" Brendale, 109 S.Ct. at 3016.
311. Id.
312. Because it was not argued before the Court, Stevens reserves judgment on
whether the county and tribe could maintain concurrent jurisdiction. Id. at 3013 n.3.
But, unlike Justice Blackmun, Stevens posits that "overlapping land use regulations
are not inherently suspect." Id. (citing multiple cases).
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has not "surrendered its historic right to regulate land use."' 3
He distinguishes the open area from the closed area, which has
maintained its "pristine, wilderness-like character." '14  "By
maintaining the power to exclude nonmembers from entering
all but a small portion of the closed area, the Tribe has pre-
served the power to define the essential character of that
region." ' Thus, Justice Stevens concludes that in the closed
area the tribe still possesses exclusive jurisdiction.
As pointed out by Justice Blackmun, Justice Stevens's
approach fails to offer an organizing principle for lower courts
to follow. "Justice Stevens's opinion not only would establish a
... regime of 'checkerboard' zoning authority in 'open' areas of
every reservation, but it would require an intrinsically standar-
dless threshold determination as to when a section of a reser-
vation contains sufficient non-Indian land holdings to warrant
an 'open' classification."3 16 Moreover, if tribes wish to main-
tain their exclusive authority, the Stevens approach implicitly
denies tribes the opportunity to modernize their organizations
and economically develop their reservations. Such actions
would risk being labeled "integration" and a "voluntary sur-
render" of historic tribal rights.
3 17
4. The Law After Brendale
Justice White's opinion and Justice Blackmun's dissent
illustrate the fundamental division in the Court with respect to
tribal governmental power. In such a situation, one cannot
help being drawn towards vote counting. Since Brendale was
decided, one of the three subscribers to the full sovereignty
view has left the Court .3 " Furthermore, Justice Blackmun
himself joined the majority in Duro, a subsequent case denying
tribes criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.319
313. See id. at 3013.
314. Id. at 3016.
315. Id. at 3013.
316. Id. at 3025-26.
317. Arguably, however, the Supreme Court's decision in Rice v. Rehner already
subjects tribes to such a risk. In Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983), the Court upheld
concurrent tribal and state regulation of on-reservation sales of alcoholic beverages. In
so doing, the Court stated that tradition simply has not recognized inherent tribal
authority in favor of exclusive liquor regulation by Indians.
318. Justice Brennan's seat was taken over by David Souter in 1990. Souter's
views on Indian law remain unknown at this point.
319. See Duro v. Reina, 110 S.Ct. 2053 (1990). Congress recently passed a rider to
the 1990 Defense Appropriations Bill that limits the holding of Duro until September
30, 1991, by which time more comprehensive legislation will be developed to clarify the
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Although Duro involved criminal, not civil, jurisdiction, the
rationales for the holding arguably apply equally in both
areas. 320 First, the governmental power of tribes cannot be
described as full territorial sovereignty. Rather it is a sover-
eignty based on consent-a sovereignty merely over certain
persons and their property. Second, one does not consent to be
governed by all tribes merely because one consents to be gov-
erned by one tribe; the nonmember thus stands in the same
shoes as the non-Indian.
It appears that Justice Marshall is now the Court's only
true believer in the view generally accepted in academic jour-
nals-the full territorial sovereignty view. With one new Jus-
tice on the Court, the White view may now command a
majority, which, in light of the legislative history articulated
above, coincides with historical congressional intent. More-
over, Justice White's view fits within the state action argument
discussed above, which, the Court implicitly recognized in
Ouro.
321
The lessons emanating from Brendale may be summarized
as follows: (1) The allotment acts diminished the territorial
sovereignty of tribes such that tribes now essentially enjoy
only a form of personal sovereignty; (2) tribes have no inher-
ent power to govern nonmembers on fee lands, their sole basis
for regulating nonmembers is the property power to exclude;
(3) the Montana second exception is now narrower in that
tribes can no longer seek to regulate nonmembers conduct by
merely showing that such conduct "threatens or has some
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or
the health or welfare of the tribe;" rather, they must now
show a "demonstrably serious impact" that "imperils" such
interests; (4) even when a serious impact imperilling such tri-
bal interests is shown, tribes are entitled only to go to court to
challenge the nonmember conduct, not to regulate generally
the conduct with respect to tribal land.
intent of Congress on the issue of tribal power to exercise criminal misdeameanor
jurisdiction over non-member Indians. Pub. L. 100-511 § 8070(b)-(d).
320. Compare Justice Stevens's dissent in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455
U.S. 130, 159-160 (1982) with Justice Kennedy's opinion in Duro. Justice Kennedy
follows Justice Stevens's approach in Merrion by basing tribal authority upon consent.
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 173 (citing Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1978) ("In this Nation
each sovereign governs only with the consent of the governed.") Why Justice Stevens
diverged from this approach in Brendale is an interesting question beyond the scope of
this Article.
321. Duro, 110 S.Ct. at 2064 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)).
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E. A Unified Theory: Two Promises, Two Propositions
The current civil war over the extent of tribal governmen-
tal power over nonmembers arose out of inconsistent federal
promises to Indian tribes and to nonmember citizens residing
and doing business within the exterior boundaries of Indian
reservations. During a time of complete separation and
nonintercourse between Indians and non-Indians, the federal
government signed treaties with the tribes promising land
reserved for their exclusive use and benefit. But when the fed-
eral government invited non-Indians to purchase land inside
the reservations, exclusive tribal use ended. And over the
lands allotted in fee simple, the federal government promised
non-Indians that states, not tribes, would exercise civil and
criminal jurisdiction.
Congress, not the Supreme Court, holds plenary power
over Indian affairs. Therefore, rather than attempting to fash-
ion some sort of federal common law of Indian tribal sover-
eignty through an exegesis of case law, the Court should limit
itself to an analysis of the relevant treaties and statutes. The
two major acts giving rise to the current tension are the Gen-
eral Allotment Act of 1887 and the Wheeler-Howard Act of
1934. From the legislative history of these two major pieces of
legislation, one may discern two general propositions that lead
toward a just and efficient judicial resolution of the tension.
First, Indian tribes maintain exclusive jurisdiction over tri-
bal members, tribal land and tribal resources on the reserva-
tions. Second, state and local governments maintain exclusive
jurisdiction over nonmembers, and their lands and resources
on the reservations.322 Notice that, to a large extent, the
respective interests of tribes, local governments, and states are
based on personal rather than territorial sovereignty.
Accepting these two propositions as a starting point, one
may fit Indian law into familiar constitutional jurisprudence.
322. State jurisdiction over nonmembers is premised on the General Allotment
Act, Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 6, 24 Stat. 390 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1970)); see
also California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) (state laws
apply unless they have been preempted or otherwise interfere with tribal self-
government).
In Duro, as we have seen, the Court held that tribal criminal jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians was no greater than that over non-Indians. The question remains,
however, whether that same rule will apply in civil cases. If the issue is
"representative democracy" or "consent of the governed," then the rule should apply
in civil cases as well. This rule is also preferable as a practical matter. Otherwise, the
Court would have to delineate a great number of imperceptible distinctions.
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Under strict scrutiny analysis, if a government impairs a fun-
damental individual right or interest, then, to withstand consti-
tutional attack, the government must show that the
governmental action is necessary to the achievement of a com-
pelling government interest. Under rational basis analysis, if a
government does not impair a fundamental individual right or
interest but merely impairs some right or interest, then, to
withstand constitutional attack, all the government need show
is (1) that the governmental action is plausibly related to (2)
some legitimate governmental interest. Because nonmembers
are foreclosed from the right to participate in a government to
which rule they are subject-a fundamental right-tribal
assertions of jurisdiction over nonmembers should be subject
to strict scrutiny.
Indian tribes have a compelling interest in self-govern-
ment. Because self-government connotes a sovereignty primar-
ily over persons, tribal self-government means effective control
over tribal members, tribal land, and tribal resources on the
reservations.
There is Court precedent for constitutional-type analysis
in Indian law decisions. For example, in Montana v. United
States323 the Court implicitly employed a kind of strict scrutiny
analysis: "exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to
protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations
is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes.' '32 4 This
sentence also identifies the tribal interest involved, that is, a
tribe's power to govern its own members, and recongizes that
under some circufnstances, albeit very limited, preservation of
that power may require the exercise of tribal power over non-
members as well.32 5
Before examining what such circumstances might be, note
that the Court has faced and resolved a parallel problem in
Indian law, i.e., the extent to which a state may exercise its
powers over tribal members even with the reservation. For
example, in Colville3 26 and Puyallup,3 2 7 the State of Washing-
323. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
324. Id. at 565-66 (emphasis supplied).
325. See supra notes 268-270 and accompanying text. In Duro, the court invoked
the equal protection and due process clauses to strike down criminal jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians. And, as discussed earlier, the rational basis test has been
employed at least twice for Indian law issues.
326. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 444 U.S. 134
(1980). In Colville, the court upheld a state requirement that tribal smokeshops affix
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ton rebutted the general presumption of a tribe's exclusive
authority over its members by showing that state regulatory
control over tribal members, even on trust land, is necessary to
maintain effective control over its non-Indian citizens328 or its
resources.32
9
Indeed, the essence of the "mirror image" theory is simply
this: The conditions and criteria for determining the scope of
exceptions to the general propositions concerning exclusive
jurisdiction, respectively, of state and local governments over
non-members, and tribes over members, should be parallel.
Thus, tribal, state, and local governments are all protected by
what this Article terms a "mirror image safety valve."
How does this "mirror image" theory fit with recent Court
decisions involving the scope of civil tribal power over non-
members? It fits Montana quite well, because the Court there
rejected the tribal claim. But in dicta the Court formulated
two exceptions to the general proposition that tribal govern-
mental powers do not extend to the activities of nonmembers
of the tribe. First, "[a] tribe may regulate, through taxation,
licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who
enter into consensual relationships with the tribe or its mem-
bers, through commercial dealings, contracts, leases, or other
arrangements. '' 3 ° Second, a tribe may be able to civilly regu-
late nonmember conduct when such conduct imposes a
"demonstrably serious impact imperilling tribal political integ-
rity, economic security, or health and welfare." 33' The Second
exception is troublesome with its vague contours. The
Brendale case provided the Court with the opportunity to
sharpen those contours.
Implicitly, at least, the plurality joining in Justice White's
opinion employed the mirror image theory in Brendale. The
tax stamps to cigarettes in order to assist the state in collecting and enforcing its sales
and excise taxes imposed in reservation sales of cigarettes by tribes to nonmembers of
the tribe. The Court said this was a minimal burden upon Indian retailers.
327. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Game Dept. of Washington, 433 U.S. 165 (1977). In
Puyallup, the Court upheld the state's authority to regulate the tribe's on-reservation
treaty fishing rights when such regulations are reasonable and necessary for the
conservation of natural resources, e.g., steelhead game fish.
328. Colville, 444 U.S. 134 (imposition of taxes).
329. Puyallup, 433 U.S. 165 (regulation of steelhead salmon).
330. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66 (emphasis supplied). Note that the Court's
decision in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982), would fall into this
exception.
331. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66.
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Court reversed with respect to the open area. Among the
grounds stated by the plurality for doing so was that the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals erroneously applied a rational basis
test when it should have applied a strict scrutiny test.3 2
Accordingly, because the district court found that the tribe
failed to rebut the general presumption by showing a compel-
ling interest, the Court ruled in favor of the county. Had the
court explicitly employed the mirror image theory, it probably
would have reached the same result.3 3
However, the mirror image theory is not consistent with
the reasoning of all recent cases. For example, the mirror
image theory would undermine Justice Marshall's reasoning in
332. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Nation, 109 S.Ct.
2994, 3008-09 (1989).
333. The following discussion illustrates how Brendale could have been decided
had the Court explicitly employed the mirror image theory. The dispute in the open
area involved a nonmember on nonmember land. Thus, to rebut the presumption of
county jurisdiction, the tribe should have the burden of showing that tribal land use
jurisdiction was necessary to the achievement of some compelling interest. The tribe
might argue that the most efficient form of land use control would be exclusive tribal
jurisdiction. But this argument should fail because while efficiency is a legitimate
governmental interest, it is not a compelling one. Moreover, because over 80 percent
of the population are nonmembers, the most efficient land use system is probably
exclusive county jurisdiction. Alternatively, the tribe might argue that exclusive tribal
jurisdiction is necessary to protect its compelling interest in self-government. A fact
militating against such a finding is that before the tribe brought suit in Brendale, the
county had exercised exclusive zoning jurisdiction for 35 years; indeed, it was the
county which originally denied Mr. Brendale's development approval. Given the
population and fee ownership characteristics, the tribe would simply be hard pressed
to show that exclusive county jurisdiction over nonmembers in the open area
threatens its compelling interest in maintaining effective control over its members, its
land or its resources.
Suppose the county approved the development of a tacky theme park; would the
tribe then prevail? Probably not. In this situation the tribe would probably hurdle the
compelling interest test. But because other means exist whereby the tribe could
protect its interest, e.g., a nuisance suit grounded upon the treaty promise or federal
law, the tribe would probably fail to prove that tribal jurisdiction was necessary.
In the closed area, however, the tribe would stand a significantly better chance of
prevailing. As in the open area, the dispute involves a nonmember on nonmember
land. Thus, the tribe would have the burden of rebutting the presumption in favor of
county jurisdiction. But, because the tribe still has the power to exclude nonmembers
from 97 percent of the land in the closed area, the tribe will more easily be able to
prove a compelling interest in maintaining the character of the closed area. This is
buttressed by the fact that the tribe severely restricts permissible uses of land in the
closed area. The difficult question is whether exclusive tribal jurisdiction is a least
restrictive means to protect the tribe's compelling interest. The equities in favor of the
tribe are far greater in the closed area than in the open area. For that reason,
exclusive tribal jurisdiction seems more reasonable. And it is likely that the Court
would find exclusive tribal jurisdiction a sufficiently tailored means to protect tribal
interests.
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Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe.' In Merrion, the Court
upheld the imposition of an oil and gas severance tax on tribal
lands leased to nonmembers, despite the fact that the tribe had
lost the power to exclude nonmembers until the term of lease
expired. Justice Marshall's majority opinion cites Gibbons v.
Ogden"s in support of the proposition that tribal power to tax
does not derive solely from the property power to exclude but
also from the sovereign power to control economic activity
within its jurisdiction s.33 Thus, the tribe may contract away its
proprietary interest in land, and then come back later and
extract more from the contract pursuant to its sovereign power
to tax, zone, or even condemn the land.
The Court's reliance on Gibbons, however, is both telling
and misplaced. It is telling because it reveals the extent to
which Marshall subscribes to the full territorial sovereignty
view of tribal governmental power. It is misplaced because
Gibbons is the famous 1824 case in which Chief Justice Mar-
shall held that where a state statute concerning interstate com-
merce conflicts with a federal statute, the federal statute will
control; but it is disingenous to analogize tribal sovereignty to
the sovereignty of the United States for, as discussed earlier in
this Article,' 7 the sovereignty of an Indian tribe is much more
limited than, and is subject to complete defeasance by, the sov-
ereignty of the United States. In so far as it recognizes tribal
powers as primarily personal-not territorial-in nature, the
mirror image theory undermines Justice Marshall's broad view
of territorial sovereignty over all lands (whether owned by
nonmembers or not) located within the exterior boundaries of
reservations.
Changing the facts of Merrion slightly will illustrate how
Justice Marshall's approach differs from the mirror image
approach. Suppose that the plaintiffs in Merrion had owned
their land in fee simple, rather than leasing it from the tribe.
Under Justice Marshall's Merrion approach, this change in
facts would not alter the reasoning. Under the mirror image
approach, however, the fact that the land could be traced to
the allotment promise to non-Indians would fundamentally
alter the reasoning. Because the case would concern nonmem-
334. 455 U.S. 130 (1981).
335. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
336. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137.
337. See supra notes 27-39 and accompanying text.
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bers on nonmember-owned land, the mirror image analysis
would begin with the general proposition of exclusive state and
county jurisdiction. To rebut this proposition, the tribe might
show that the nonmembers had consented to tribal taxation by
entering into some sort of commercial dealings with the tribe
in connection with the oil and gas production.3" If the tribe
were unable to show such consent, then the tribe would need
to show that the severance of oil and gas on this nonmember-
owned land imposed a demonstrably serious impact imperilling
tribal political integrity, economic security, or health and wel-
fare.339 Depending upon the circumstances, it is not unlikely
that the tribe could enjoin the oil and gas production on any of
those bases. The oil and gas production may be "like a pig in
the parlour," denigrating the political integrity of the tribe.
Alternatively, the tribe may show that the cost of governmen-
tal services provided by the tribe and used by the nonmember
oil producers is such that the tribe should be reimbursed.
Finally, the tribe may show that oil and gas production
imposes significant health risks to tribal members resident
nearby. Of course, if the tribe were able to succeed in
obtaining an injunction, it could also later negotiate with the
nonmember oil producers to exact economic concessions as
great as could be obtained through the imposition of a sever-
ance tax.30
The invocation of mirror-image strict scrutiny, therefore,
will not necessarily be fatal to a governmental action. While
the general propositions state the rule to be applied in most
cases, the safety valve is a real one. That is, the mirror image
theory recognizes some remaining tension between the two
propositions and provides a means of resolving it.
In mirror image circumstances to those illustrated above,
Indian tribes would likewise be able to rebut the general pre-
sumption of exclusive state authority over nonmembers. For
example, in New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe,"1 the
Court upheld exclusive tribal regulatory jurisdiction over
hunting and fishing by members and nonmembers within the
338. The Merrion decision should be thought of as falling into this "consensual
relations" exception to the general proposition that tribes maintain no governmental
authority over nonmembers.
339. See Brendale discussion, supra notes 275-321 and accompanying text.
340. This may well lead to most economically efficient use of the lands. See Coase,
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
341. 462 U.S. 110 (1983).
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reservation. Conversely, the presumptions are not easily
rebutted. Thus, in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians,"2 the Court denied California from regulating bingo
operations on tribal land where the state could show no com-
pelling interest. 
3
In addition to the mirror image safety valve, tribes enjoy
other means of protecting themselves. First, because the
tribes' protectable interests arise under federal law, state and
local governments are required to recognize and respect tribal
interests in the course of their activities. Second, tribes may
seek explicit congressional action, as has been done in the area
of environmental regulation.' Third, tribes can exercise
political checks through exercise of their rights to vote and run
for political office, which operate on the federal, state, and
local levels.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article suggests that the Supreme Court has implic-
itly adopted, and should explicitly adopt, an Indian law juris-
dictional theory based on two general propositions establishing
the mirror-image, compelling interests of state and tribal gov-
ernments over their respective citizens and members, and their
lands and resources. Explicit adoption of this theory would
internally unify the various and widely divergent concepts cur-
rently employed by courts in resolving difficult issues concern-
ing the relations between Indians and non-Indians on
reservations. Moreover, it would externally unify Indian law
with traditional constitutional principles.
Justice Black once wrote that "[gireat nations, like great
342. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
343. The Court recognized that the state had legitimate interest in tribal gambling
operations; but given the fact that the state allowed controlled gambling, the Court
said the state's interest was not "compelling". Id. at 220-21. Moreover, the Court
found that the tribe had a compelling (economic) interest in continuing to run their
bingo and gambling operations. Id. at 222.
344. See, e.g., PUB. L. 95-95, Title I, § 117(a), 91 Stat. 712 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7401 et seq.) (1977 amendments to Clean Air Act); PUB. L. 99-499, Title I, §§ 101,
114(b), 127(a), Title V, § 517(c)(2), 100 Stat. 1615, 1652, 1692, 1774 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601 eL seq. (1986 amendments to the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act); Pub. L. 99-339, Title III § 302(b), 100 Stat. 666
(codified at 33 U.S.C. § 300 (f)) (1986 amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act);
PUB. L. 100-4, Title III § 316(b), 101 Stat. 60 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1251 eL seq.) (1987
Amendments to the Clean Water Act).
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men, should keep their word."'  Recognizing that two
promises were made by the federal government with respect to
reservation lands, i.e., the promises made to Indians in the
treaties and the promises made to non-Indians in the allotment
acts, the two propositions provide a means whereby the federal
government may keep its word to both Indians and non-Indi-
ans. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the two propos-
tions are consistent with the congressional reconciliation of the
two promises as embodied in the Wheeler-Howard Act of 1934.
345. Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960)
(Black, J., dissenting).
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